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Sodomy and Public Morality Offenses
Under U.S. Immigration Law:
Penalizing Lesbian and
Gay Identity
Until 1990, the United States was the only country in the world with
an explicit policy of excluding visitors and potential immigrants because
of their sexual orientation.' Although the word "homosexual" has
never appeared in U.S. immigration law, from 1952 to 1990 most U.S.
courts interpreted the provision excluding persons "afflicted with a psy-
chopathic personality' 2 to require the exclusion of any person identified
as homosexual or who engaged in homosexual acts.3 Countless individ-
uals have been excluded at the border, deported, or denied naturaliza-
tion under this provision.4 After years of lobbying by openly gay
Congressperson Barney Frank and others,5 and in the wake of increas-
I. For a discussion of the singularity of U.S. policy, see Exclusion and Deportation
Amendments of 1983: Hearing on H.R. 4509 and H.R. 5227 Before the Subcomm. on Immi-
gration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 193 (1984) [hereinafter Exclusion and Deportation Amendments of 1983] (testimony
of Vickey Monrean, executive director, National Gay Rights Lobby); and Richard
Green, "Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Huddled Masses" (of Heterosexuals): An Analy-
sis of American and Canadian Immigration Polity, 16 ANGLo-AM. L. REV. 139, 157 (1987)
(citing Record of the Association of the Bar of New York).
2. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 excluded "[a]liens afflicted with
a psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or a mental defect." In 1965, Congress elimi-
nated epilepsy and added "sexual deviation." Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, § 212(a)(4), Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, 182, amended by Act of Oct. 3, 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(4) (1988) (repealed 1990)). The entire provision was eliminated by the
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
3. See infra Section II.
4. It is difficult to state precisely the number of persons affected by the provision
because the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) does not keep statistics on
the disposition of cases involving homosexuals. The number of exclusions are espe-
cially hard to track because most excludable aliens are denied visas by U.S. consular
officials abroad, and no public records of these denials are kept. See THOMAS ALEXAN-
DER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 115-16 (2d
ed. 1991) (summarizing visa issue process). See also Exclusion and Deportation Amend-
ments of 1983, supra note 1, at 191-92 (testimony of Donald C. Knutson of National
Gay Rights Advocates, noting that statistics fail to reflect the number of lesbians and
gay men excluded at the border).
5. Frank had introduced bills revising the grounds for exclusion and deportation
since 1983. See Exclusion and Deportation Amendments of 1983, supra note 1; H.R. REP.
No. 882, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 HousE REPORT].
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ingly tangled litigation challenging the exclusion of lesbians and gay
men,6 Congress eliminated the "psychopathic personality" exclusion in
1990 as part of a general reform of the old exclusion grounds. 7 Under
the 1990 Act, lesbians and gay men are no longer automatically barred
from entering or immigrating to the United States.
The elimination of the provision used to exclude lesbians and gay
men significantly redressed the homophobic bias of U.S. immigration
law.8 Even after the 1990 Act, however, lesbians and gay men convicted
of sodomy or of a public morality offense9 are at risk of exclusion or
deportation under the "crimes involving moral turpitude" exclusion, 10
and may be denied citizenship under the "good moral character"
requirement.1 ' Both within the United States and internationally, lesbi-
ans and gay men are prosecuted under sodomy and public morality stat-
utes which are often used to target lesbians and gay men by penalizing
the expression of lesbian and gay identity, especially when that expres-
sion is deemed "public."' 12 Public expressions of heterosexual identity
are not similarly policed or criminalized.13 Although the 1990 Act elim-
inated the rationale for doing so, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) and the courts continue to exercise their discretion to use
Others who have attempted to repeal the provision include Representative Julian
Dixon, H.R. 2815, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984); Senator Alan Cranston, S. 1086,
98th Gong., 1st Sess. (1984); and Representative Edward Roybal, H.R. 4909, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). See also Peter Fowler & Leonard Graff, Gay Aliens and Immigra-
tion: Resolving the Conflict Between Hill and Longstaff, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 621, 639-40
(1985) (summarizing legislative attempts to repeal the provision through 1985).
6. See infra notes 56-72 and accompanying text.
7. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-
1524 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)). The 1990 Act modified, regrouped, and condensed
the old grounds of exclusion into nine classes of excludable aliens, now grouped
together in Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)
(1988 & Supp. I 1990).
8. Now that the categorical exclusion of homosexuals has been eliminated, this
bias is perhaps most evident in the fact that the INA provides no way for lesbians and
gay men to bring their non-U.S. citizen partners into the United States on a perma-
nent basis. See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 458
U.S. 1111 (1982) (refusing to admit the partner of a gay U.S. citizen, even though the
court assumed the marriage between the two men was valid under state law). See also
Sandra E. Lundya, "I Do, But I Can't ": Immigration Policy and Gay Domestic Relationships,
5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 185 (1986).
9. Throughout this Note, I use the phrase "public morality offenses" as a catch-
all term that encompasses a variety of statutes that target the public expression of
lesbian and gay identity. Some of these statutes are specifically designed to target
lesbians and gay men. Examples of this type include statutes that criminalize the
solicitation of homosexual sex, "indecency between men," and "procuring others to
commit a homosexual act." The majority of public morality offenses were neither
specifically designed nor intended to target lesbians and gay men, but are frequently
used to do so. Examples of this type include public indecency, public lewdness, and
disorderly conduct statutes. See infra Section III.
10. INA §§ 212(a)(2)(A)-(B), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)-(B) (1988 & Supp. II
1990).
11. INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
12. See infra notes 211-64 and accompanying text.
13. Id.
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these statutes to exclude and deport gays and lesbians from the country,
and to deny them citizenship and other benefits and privileges. 14
This Note argues that the discriminatory impact of sodomy and
public morality offenses on lesbians and gay men under current U.S.
immigration law is an anomalous and irrational vestige of the pre-1990
law, and violates both the Constitutional "uniform rule of naturaliza-
tion" requirement and the intent of Congress, as expressed in the 1990
Act, to place homosexual and heterosexual immigrants on an equal foot-
ing. Part I provides a brief overview of U.S. immigration law procedures
and of the historical exclusion of lesbians and gay men under U.S. immi-
gration law, up to the 1990 reform. Part II analyzes the case law that has
invoked the "crimes involving moral turpitude" exclusion and the
"good moral character" requirement against lesbians and gay men con-
victed of sodomy or of public morality offenses. Part III describes the
harassment of lesbians and gay men under these statutes, both within
the United States and internationally, and the growing opposition to this
harassment among international human rights organizations. Part IV
argues that the discriminatory impact of these statutes on lesbians and
gay men in the U.S. immigration system violates both the Constitutional
"uniform rule of naturalization" clause and the 1990 Act.
I. U.S. Immigration Law
A. Immigration Agencies and Procedures
Immigration into the United States is governed by the Immigration and
Naturalization Act (INA). 15 The INA distinguishes between immigrants
who enter as longterm or permanent residents, and non-immigrants
who enter on a temporary basis for a specific purpose such as study,
tourism, or temporary work.16 The INA specifies the criteria for admis-
sion for each category, 17 lists the grounds on which individuals can be
excluded and deported from the country,' 8 and sets out the conditions
for becoming a citizen.19
Immigrants, or those who seek to become permanent U.S. resi-
dents, must qualify under the admissions criteria in order to enter. Cur-
rently, the primary criteria for admission are family ties and employer
sponsorship. 20 Both immigrants and non-immigrants are subject to the
statutory grounds for exclusion and deportation. 2 1 The grounds for
14. See infra Section II.
15. Pub. L. No. 820-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1554 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
16. INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
17. INA § 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (admission criteria for
immigrants). INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (1988 & Supp. II 1990)
(admission criteria for non-immigrants, in the form of preference categories).
18. INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (grounds of exclusion).
INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (grounds of deportation).
19. INA §§ 310, 335, 336, 8"U.S.C. §§ 1421, 1446, 1447 (1988 & Supp. I 1990).
20. INA §§ 201-203, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1153 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
21. INA §§ 212, 241, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1251 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
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exclusion specify actions and conditions that bar an alien from entering
the United States in the first place.2 2 The grounds for deportation spec-
ify actions and conditions that can be used to subsequently expel an
alien after she has entered. 23 Persons who enter as immigrants become
eligible for naturalization after five years of residence. Persons who
enter as non-immigrants may become eligible under certain limited cir-
cumstances (the most common is marriage to a U.S. citizen) for "adjust-
ment of status" to that of immigrant.2 4
The immigration system is administered by the State and Justice
Departments. Consular officers stationed in foreign countries are State
Department officials responsible for issuing visas to aliens who petition
for non-immigrant visas and who demonstrate their qualifications to
enter. 25 For persons who wish to enter as immigrants, a U.S. citizen or a
lawful permanent resident must file a "visa petition" on the alien's
behalf, the alien must meet all of the requirements for the type of visa
under which she seeks to enter, and there must be a visa of that type
available. 2 6
The Justice Department assumes responsibility for enforcing and
administering the remainder of the immigration law. 27 The Attorney
General delegates authority to two major units within the Justice Depart-
ment, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Execu-
tive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR).28 The INS has a central
office in Washington D.C., four regional offices, and 34 district offices
which are staffed by immigration examiners who rule on visa petitions
and a variety of other matters, and by INS inspectors who examine per-
sons arriving at designated ports of entry.2 9 The EOIR is the adjudica-
tive branch and consists of immigration judges and the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA). s ° Immigration judges are primarily
responsible for hearing exclusion and deportation cases brought by the
INS. Decisions of the immigration judges are appealable to the BIA, a
five-member body appointed by the Attorney General.3 1 BIA decisions,
in turn, are appealable in the regular federal court system.3 2
22. INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
23. INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
24. INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
25. INA §§ 104, 221, 222, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1201, 1202 (1988 & Supp. II. 1990).
See also ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 4, at 115-17.
26. INA §§ 204-206, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154-1156 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). See also
ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 4, at 391-94.
27. INA § 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
28. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 4, at 10 1-04.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 111-14.
32. Id.
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B. The Exclusion of Lesbians and Gay Men: Legislative History
Prior to the 1990 Act
From the colonial period until well into the nineteenth century, immi-
gration into the United States was largely unrestricted, subject only to
the exclusion of those deemed criminal or unable to provide for them-
selves.3 3 Starting in the 1880's, Congress enacted a series of explicitly
racist and restrictive admissions statutes, which sought to control both
the number and, for the first time in the nation's history, the racial and
cultural type of immigrants who could enter the country.3 4 Several stat-
utes barred immigrants of a particular racial or national origin.3 5
National origins quotas governed immigration from countries that were
not barred. The 1921 Quota Act and the 1924 National Origin Act
established a national origins quota system that gave preference to
immigrants who were perceived as easily assimilable into Anglo-Saxon
culture.3 6 The McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 consolidated this restric-
tive policy by setting permanent quotas that allocated the great majority
of available immigrant slots to the United Kingdom, Germany, and Ire-
land.3 7 The United States maintained a racially-based policy until 1965
when Congress abolished the national origins quota system in favor of
admissions criteria that emphasized family unity and occupational
skills.38 The 1990 Act retained the 1965 admission criteria but shifted
the balance between family-based and employment-based immigration
by tripling the number of immigrants granted entry because of their
occupational and educational status.3 9
33. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS., GROUNDS FOR
ExCLUSION OF ALIENS UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT: HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS, 5-6 (Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter GROUNDS FOR
ExCLUSION].
34. GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION, supra note 33, at 6-27; MILTON R. KONVrrz, CIVIL
RIGTrs IN IMMIGRATION 1-28 (1953); SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFU-
GEE POLICY (SCIRP), U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, STAFF
REPORT 92, 161-216 (1981) [hereinafter SCIRP STAFF REPORT].
35. Chinese Exclusion Acts, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875), ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58
(1882), ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (1882) (prohibiting immigration from China); Immigra-
tion Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (1917) (excluding persons from India, parts of
Russia, Arabia, Afghanistan, Siam, and the East Indian Islands); Immigration Act of
1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924) (excluding Japanese immigrants and immigrants
from Korea, Burma, Malaysia, Polynesia, New Zealand, and Tahiti). See also KoNvrrz,
supra note 34, at 4-8 (discussing racially-based immigration laws); SCIRP STAFF
REPORT, supra note 34.
36. Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, § 2, 42 Stat. 5. Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, § 11,
43 Stat. 153. See also Komvrrz, supra note 34, at 10-16; SCIRP STAFF REPORT, supra
note 34.
37. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). See
also KONVTZ, supra note 34, at 12; SCIRP STAFF REPORT, supra note 34.
38. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236,
79 Stat. 911. See also SCIRP STAFF REPORT, supra note 34.
39. INA §§ 201-203, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1153 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). See also C.
GORDON & S. MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT:
THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1990 8-10 (1991).
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In addition to establishing criteria for admission into the United
States, immigration statutes from the colonial period through the 1990
Act have also listed an increasing number of grounds of exclusion on
which aliens can be prohibited from entering or forced to leave the
country. 40 The earliest colonial statutes prohibited the entry of
criminals, paupers, and those with mental or physical debilities.4 1 Sub-
sequent statutes at the federal level expanded the list of excludables to
include polygamists, anarchists, prostitutes, vagrants, persons convicted
of crimes involving moral turpitude, persons with contagious diseases,
and illiterates.42
Enacted in 1952 over President Truman's veto, the McCarran-Wal-
ter Act institutionalized McCarthy-era xenophobia and paranoia about
the threat of political subversion by legislating the most dramatic expan-
sion of the grounds for exclusion in the nation's history.43 A major
impetus behind the 1952 Act was the concern, as voiced by Senator
McCarran, that "our present laws are shot through with weaknesses and
loopholes, and . . . criminals, Communists, and subversives of all
descriptions are even now gaining admission into this country like water
through a sieve and we cannot under our present laws effectively
exclude or deport them." 44 In response to this perceived crisis, the
1952 Act excluded narcotics laws violators, addicts, persons entering the
country to engage in immoral sexual acts, persons entering under false
statements, persons assisting illegal immigration, and, most notoriously,
Communists and homosexuals.45
The 1952 Act excluded lesbians and gay men on medical grounds
by placing homosexuals under the general category of "aliens afflicted
40. See generally GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION, supra note 33, at 5-27 (summarizing
changing grounds of exclusion and deportation under U.S. immigration law).
41. Id. at 5-6. See also E. P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1798-1965 390 (1981).
42. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477 (excluding prostitutes and con-
victed felons); Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214 (excluding "lunatics,"
"idiots," and those liable to become a public charge); Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551,
§ 1, 26 Stat. 1084 (excluding polygamists, "persons suffering from a loathsome or a
contagious disease," and "persons who have been convicted of a felony or other...
crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude"); Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012,
§ 2, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214 (excluding anarchists); Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 2,
34 Stat. 898, 898-99 (excluding aliens convicted of a crime or misdemeanor involving
moral turpitude); Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875-78 (excluding
illiterates). See GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION, supra note 33, at 6-16.
43. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414. See GROUNDS
FOR ExcLUSION, supra note 33, at 26-27; SCIRP STAFF REPORT, supra note 34, at 723-
97.
44. 98 CONG. REC. 8254 (1952).
45. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, INA § 212(a), Pub. L. No. 82-414,
66 Stat. 163, 182 (repealed 1990) (listing grounds for exclusion). See especially INA
§ 212(a)(4) (exclusion of "aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or
a mental defect"), and INA §§ 212(a)(27)-(29) (ideological exclusions). See also
GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION, supra note 33, at 26-27 (summarizing exclusions under
1952 Act).
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with a psychopathic personality, epilepsy or a mental defect."' 46 This
categorization reflected the contemporary dominant view that homosex-
uality was a mental illness. 47 It also had the advantage of investing what
might otherwise have seemed an exercise in bigotry with the authority of
medical science. Deferring to the medical expertise of the Public Health
Service (PHS),4 8 legislators abandoned an initial draft of the Act that
had specifically named "homosexuals and sex perverts" 49 as an excluda-
ble class. The PHS voiced concern about the difficulty of diagnosing
homosexuality. 50 It advised the legislature to use the more general lan-
guage of "psychopathic personality or mental defect" to make the diag-
nosis of covert homosexuals easier.5 1  Congress accepted this
recommendation and adopted the more general language, but regis-
tered the caveat that "[t]his change of nomenclature is not to be con-
strued in any way as modifying the intent to exclude all aliens who are
sexual deviates." 5 2
46. The 1952 Act, INA § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1988) (repealed 1990),
excluded "[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or a mental
defect," and grouped homosexuality with six other medical grounds for exclusion:
mental retardation; insanity; one or more attacks of insanity; narcotic drug addiction
or chronic alcoholism; dangerous contagious disease; physical defect, disease, or dis-
ability that may affect ability to earn a living. INA §§ 212(a)(1)-(3), (5)-(7), 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1182(a)(1)-(3), (5)-(7) (1988) (repealed 1990). In 1967, Congress amended the
INA to replace epilepsy with "sexual deviation." Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(4)) (repealed 1990).
47. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MAN-
UAL: MENTAL DISORDERS 38-39 (1952) (listing homosexuality as a type of "sociopathic
personality disturbance"). For a general history of the characterization of homosexu-
ality as a mental illness, see RICHARD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIA-
TRY: THE POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS (1981).
48. The Public Health Service (PHS) is an agency in the Department of Health
and Human Services, headed by the Attorney General. PHS doctors are authorized
to examine entering aliens at ports of entry and overseas. See INA §§ 234, 236(d), 8
U.S.C. §§ 1224, 1226(d) (1988 and Supp. 11 1990).
49. See S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 345 (1950) (recommending that
the category of "mental defectives" under the 1917 Act be amended to include
"homosexuals and sex perverts"). See also S. 3455, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), and
S. 716, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1951) (specifically excluding "homosexuals and sex
perverts").
50. Ordinarily, a history of homosexuality must be obtained from the individ-
ual, which he may successfully cover up. Some psychological tests may be
helpful in uncovering homosexuality of which the individual, himself, may be
unaware. At the present time there are no reliable laboratory tests which
would be helpful in making a diagnosis.
REPORT OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ON THE MEDICAL ASPECT OF H.R. 2379, H.R.
REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 46, 47 (1952) [hereinafter 1952 HousE REPORT],
reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1701.
51. The PHS reasoned that this general language included homosexuals, and that
"[i]n those instances in which the disturbance in sexuality may be difficult to uncover,
a more obvious disturbance in personality may be encountered which would warrant
a classification of psychopathic personality or mental defect." Id. at 47.
52. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1952). See also 1952 HousE REPORT,
supra note 50, at 42-48, reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1701 (accepting PHS
recommendation).
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The 1952 Act also specified the procedure the INS was required to
follow in order to exclude or deport individuals on one of the medical
grounds. According to the statutory procedure, the INS referred any
person suspected of homosexuality, or any other excludable mental or
physical condition, to a PHS official for an examination.5 3 The PHS offi-
cial diagnosed the individual, certified the existence of a psychopathic
personality or other condition, and issued a "Class A certificate" to the
INS officer.5 4 This certificate subsequently constituted the sole evi-
dence for exclusion or deportation at the exclusion or deportation
hearing.5 5
The original McCarran-Walter provision effectively served its exclu-
sionary purpose until 1963 when the Ninth Circuit declared that the
term "psychopathic personality" failed to provide sufficient notice that it
included homosexuality.5 6 Congress responded in 1965 by adding
"sexual deviation" to the provision, apparently to avoid any ambiguity
about its intention to exclude homosexuals.5 7 In 1967, the Supreme
Court in Boutilier v. INS 5 8 rendered this addition redundant by rejecting
the argument that the term "psychopathic personality" was unconstitu-
tionally vague. In a much-criticized decision,5 9 the Court examined the
legislative history of the provision and found a clear Congressional
intent to exclude homosexuals. 60 Despite abundant evidence that Con-
53. INA §§ 232, 234, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1222, 1224 (1988).
54. INA § 234, 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (1988). There are three kinds of medical certifi-
cates. A Class A certificate constitutes a definite, as opposed to an inconclusive, diag-
nosis. See C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IA IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§§ 3.15B, 3.15c (Rev. ed. 1982).
55. INA § 236(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (1988) (stating that the decision of the
immigration judge "shall be based solely upon such certification").
56. The court held that "the statutory term 'psychopathic personality', when mea-
sured by common understanding and practices, does not convey sufficiently definite
warning that homosexuality and sex perversion are embraced therein." Fleuti v.
Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 374 U.S. 449
(1963).
57. Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)
(repealed 1990). See also S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 18-19 (1965), reprinted
in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3337 (noting the 1962 decision that found "psychopathic
personality" too vague to include homosexuality and stating that "[t]o resolve any
doubt the Committee has specifically included the term 'sexual deviation' as a
ground of exclusion"). As in 1952, however, Congress relied on the then-current
psychiatric terminology of "sexual deviation" in lieu of naming homosexuality
directly.
58. 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
59. See id. at 134-35 (Douglas,J., dissenting); William N. Eskridge, Gadamer/Statu-
tory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 651-59 (1990); Thomas A. Aleinikoff,
Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 20, 47-54 (1988); Peter N. Fowler &
Leonard Graff, Gay Aliens and Immigration: Resolving the Conflict Between Hill and Long-
staff, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 89, 628-29 (1985); and Samuel M. Silvers, The Exclusion
and Expulsion of Homosexual Aliens, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 295, 306-08 (1984).
60. "The legislative history of the Act indicates beyond a shadow of a doubt that
the Congress intended the phrase 'psychopathic personality' to include homosexuals
such as petitioner." Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 120.
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gress had deferred to medical expertise in drafting the provision,61 the
Court held that "psychopathic personality" was a legal term of art
independent of its clinical meaning in medical discourse, and, as such,
clearly included homosexuality. 62
A new difficulty with using the provision to exclude lesbians and gay
men emerged in 1979 when the PHS, six years after the American Psy-
chiatric Association had removed homosexuality from its official list of
disorders, 63 informed the INS that it would no longer certify homosexu-
als as psychopathic personalitiesfr4 This new PHS policy placed the INS
in an apparently insoluble dilemma. Because the INA required the INS
to obtain official medical certification from the PHS before excluding an
alien under the "psychopathic personality" provision,65 INS officials
were left with the choice of either no longer excluding lesbians and gay
men, or of violating the mandated statutory exclusion procedure.
The Department of Justice reacted in 1980 by announcing that
although it had "the legal obligation to exclude homosexuals from
entering the United States," it would exercise that obligation "solely
upon the voluntary admission by the alien that he or she is homosex-
ual."' 66 The Justice Department announced that it was directing INS
inspectors to refrain from asking any questions about sexual orientation
during initial entry inspections. Only if an alien volunteered the infor-
mation that he or she was homosexual, or if a third party arriving at the
same time identified the alien as a homosexual, was the inspector to
deny the person entry.67 In practice, firsthand reports by lesbians and
gay men seeking to enter the country suggest that many INS inspectors
continued both to question entering aliens about their sexual orienta-
61. Id. at 121-22.
62. "We... conclude that the Congress used the phrase 'psychopathic personal-
ity' not in the clinical sense, but to effectuate its purpose to exclude from entry all
homosexuals and other sex perverts." Congress "was not laying down a clinical test,
but an exclusionary standard which it declared to be inclusive of those having homo-
sexual and perverted characteristics." Id. at 122, 124.
63. American Psychiatric Association Press Release (Dec. 15, 1973) (stating that
homosexuality "by itself does not necessarily constitute a psychiatric disorder"). In
1973, the APA removed homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
(DSM-III). See BAYER, supra note 47, at 101-78.
64. Memorandum from Julius Richmond, Assistant Secretary for Health, United
States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to William Foege, Director,
CDC, and George Lythcott, Administrator, HSA (Aug. 2, 1979), reprinted in 56 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 398-99 (1979).
65. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
66. Guidelines and Procedures for the Inspection of Aliens Who Are Suspected of Being Homo-
sexual, Press Release of the Department ofJustice (Sept. 9, 1980) [hereinafter Guide-
lines]. See also 62 INTERPRETER RELEASES 166, 166-67 (1985), and C. GORDON & S.
MAILMAN, 2 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.38B(1) at 2-274 (1989). The
Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice had informed the INS that it
was legally obliged to enforce the exclusion of lesbians and gay men, despite the new
PHS policy. Memorandum Opinion for the Acting Commissioner, INS (No. 79-85), 3
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 457 (1979).
67. Guidelines, supra note 66. See also GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION, supra note 33, at
81.
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tion, and to exclude persons appearing to be or suspected of being
homosexual.6 8
The courts divided on the legality of relying on voluntary admis-
sions as a solution to the dilemma created by the new PHS policy. In
Hill v. INS, the Ninth Circuit ruled that exclusion under the "psycho-
pathic personality" provision could only be effected through medical
certification, in effect holding that the exclusion of lesbians and gay men
was longer legally enforceable. 69 In In re Longstaff,70 however, the Fifth
Circuit disagreed, holding that medical certification was not a necessary
prerequisite for exclusion as a psychopathic personality. The Longstaff
court reasoned that because even PHS doctors would have to rely on the
alien's own statements about his or her identity and behavior, a direct
admission of homosexuality should suffice. 71 The court also relied on
Boutilier's holding that the phrase "psychopathic personality" is a legal
rather than a medical term, and that Congress intended to exclude
homosexuals regardless of their medical status.72
C. The 1990 Act
The Supreme Court had not resolved this conflict between the circuits
when the 1990 Act eliminated the provision excluding those "afflicted
with a psychopathic personality, sexual deviation, or a mental defect"
altogether. 73 The terminology used in the provision was medically
obsolete.74 Moreover, the question of how to identify lesbians and gay
68. See Exclusion and Deportation ofAliens: Hearing on H.R. 1119 Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciaiy, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 352 (1987) [hereinafter Exclusion and Deportation of Aliens] (testimony
by Robert Lundy that Canadian women traveling to yearly Michigan Women's Music
Festival subject to "salacious questioning" about sexual orientation by U.S. immigra-
tion officials); Exclusion and Deportation Amendments of 1983, supra note 1, at 185-86
(testimony of Donald C. Knutson regarding INS detention of Mexican dress designer
as a suspected homosexual). See also Silvers, supra note 59, at 298 (arguing that the
INS policy of relying on voluntary admissions is "open to great abuse and local
prejudice").
69. 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983). "Congress' intent to require a medical exami-
nation and certification of all aliens excluded on medical grounds is apparent on the
face of the statute, corroborated by the legislative history, and supported by an
unbroken string of administrative and judicial decisions." Id. at 1480.
70. 716 F.2d 1439, 1448 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984).
71. "To require the INS to disregard the most reliable source of information, the
statements of the person involved, would be to substitute secondary evidence for
primary." Id. at 1445.
72. Id. at 1443.
73. The Immigration Act of 1990,8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
The Act eliminated former INS § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1988).
74. Exclusion and Deportation Amendments of 1983, supra note 1, at 62 (statement by
James Mason, Director of Centers for Disease Control, conceding that "the medical
exclusions have become outdated"); id. at 208-10 (statement by John Talbot, presi-
dent of American Psychiatric Association, noting that homosexuality is no longer
considered a psychiatric disorder); Exclusion and Deportation of Aliens, supra note 68, at
266-67 (statement by Robert Paul Cabaj, president of Association of Lesbian and Gay
Psychiatrists, noting that "there are absolutely no possible mental health diagnoses
concerning homosexuality, nor any way to view homosexuality as pathological by cur-
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men had become an increasingly vexed one, especially after the PHS
ceased to view homosexuality as a medically certifiable condition. The
INS's stated policy of relying on voluntary admissions drew an openly
arbitrary line between lesbians and gay men who, perhaps unaware of
the consequences, announced their homosexuality to INS inspectors
and those who did not. The enforcement of the procedure was, as even
the State Department and some INS officials admitted, uneven and arbi-
trary. 75 In short, the legal uncertainties and the administrative inconsis-
tencies surrounding the exclusion had made an already controversial
provision 76 increasingly difficult to justify. In the decade of hearings
and Congressional discussion that preceded the 1990 Act, those who
supported its elimination spanned a broad ideological range, including
the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations, 77 the Select Commission
on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 78 the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, 79 and numerous civil rights organizations. 8 0
rent psychiatric thinking"); GROUNDS FOR ExcLusION, supra note 33, at 83-84 (noting
that "psychopathic personality" not recognized by DSM-III); 1988 HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 19-20 (noting that "psychopathic personality" is no longer a recog-
nized medical category, and that the exclusion of homosexuals is "inconsistent with
contemporary phychiatric [sic] theories"); H.R. REP. No. 723(I), 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., 56 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 HousE REPORT] (noting that "homosexuality is not
a medical condition").
75. In 1983, a State Department official noted that "[t]he Supreme Court's denial
of certiorari for Longstaff leaves the law in this area in a confused state. We are con-
cerned that whatever position we take may result in unfairness to some visa appli-
cants." Exclusion and Deportation Amendments of 1983, supra note 1, at 204 (testimony of
Joan Clark, Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs). See also id. at 178 (testi-
mony of Vickey Monrean, citing statement by former INS General Counsel Charles
Gordon that "[tihe INS policy presents a clear danger of unequal enforcement").
76. See GROUNDS FOR ExcLusION, supra note 33, at 80 ("The exclusion of homo-
sexuals under section 212(a)(4) .. .has been the most controversial aspect of the
grounds of exclusion in this category"); Groups Vow Legal Action if U.S. Bars Homosexuals
At Border, CHI. TRIB.,June 10, 1990, at C22 (reporting controversy over whether INS
would enforce the provision to exclude self-announced lesbians and gay men travel-
ing to the United States to attend an international AIDS conference).
77. See Exclusion and Deportation Amendments of 1983, supra note 1, at 89 (testimony
in support of elimination by James Mason, Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices); id. at 195 (letter from Joan Clark, Department of State, supporting legislative
reform); id. at 205 (letter from John F. Scruggs, Department of State, noting that
Reagan administration follows Carter administration in supporting elimination of
the exclusion); 1990 HousE REPORT, supra note 74, at 56 (noting that elimination of
the exclusion was "formally endorsed by Administration witnesses" in 1984 and
1987).
78. Exclusion and Deportation of Aliens, supra note 68, at 305-09 (letter from Law-
rence H. Fuchs, former Executive Director of SCIRP, noting that SCIRP strongly
supports elimination of the exclusion on grounds of privacy, anti-discrimination, effi-
ciency and fairness).
79. See Exclusion and Deportation Amendments of 1983, supra note 1, at 208-10; Exclu-
sion and Deportation of Aliens, supra note 68, at 266-67.
80. See Exclusion and Deportation Amendments of 1983, supra note 1, at 177, 182, 213
(Gay Rights Advocates, Gay Rights National Lobby, Lambda Legal Defense & Educa-
tion Fund); Exclusion and Deportation of Aliens, supra note 68, at 322, 352 (Human
Rights Campaign Fund, National Gay & Lesbian Task Force, and Michigan Organiza-
tion for Human Rights).
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Sponsors and supporters of the 1990 Act and of the legislative pro-
posals that preceded it also articulated more principled reasons for get-
ting rid of the exclusion. They hoped that the removal of the categorical
exclusion would place lesbians and gay men on an equal footing with
their heterosexual counterparts and eliminate the pressure on lesbians
and gay men to conceal their sexual orientation. As Senator Cranston
argued in 1985, the "inconsistent enforcement discriminates against the
openly homosexual person and those who appear homosexual even
though they may not be, and may reward those who choose to hide their
homosexuality." 8 1 Cranston also criticized "the unwise and harshly dis-
criminatory underlying law, which attempts to use private sexual orien-
tation as a criterion for judging who does and who does not qualify for
admission to the United States," and argued that the new legislation
would "end a form of discrimination which has no valid scientific or
medical basis and which violates traditional American respect for the
privacy and dignity of an individual."18 2 In 1988, the House Committee
on the judiciary agreed that "the continued existence of this ground for
exclusion in the statute is an affront to basic notions of privacy .... The
Committee strongly supports the notion that a person's sexual orienta-
tion should be a private matter, and that homosexuality should no
longer have any relevance to immigration."'83 The House Report
accompanying the 1990 Act specified that "in order to make it clear that
the United States does not view personal decisions about sexual orienta-
tion as a danger to other people in our society, the bill repeals the 'sex-
ual deviation' exclusion ground."'8 4
Both for pragmatic and for principled reasons, the 1990 Act elimi-
nated the provision that had been used to exclude lesbians and gay men.
There is currently no language in the statute that excludes or provides
for the deportation of aliens based on lesbian or gay sexual orientation.
The 1990 Act did not, however, explicitly provide new guidelines or
standards about how to interpret or apply the crimes involving moral
turpitude exclusion or the good moral character requirement.8" As
before the 1990 Act, the INS and the courts retain nearly unfettered
discretion as to how to interpret these provisions.8 6 As a result,
although U.S. immigration law no longer explicitly discriminates on the
basis of lesbian or gay identity alone, the INS and the courts have not
reevaluated their old policy of interpreting these provisions in a manner
81. 131 CONG. REC. (1985).
82. Id.
83. 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 35-36.
84. 1990 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 74, at 56.
85. The 1990 Act retained unchanged the "crimes involving moral turpitude"
ground of exclusion and the "good moral character" requirement. INA
§§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) & 316(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) & 1427(a)(3) (1988
& Supp. I 1990).
86. See infra Section II.
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that singles out lesbians and gay men for disparate treatment.8 7
H. Remaining Problems of Discrimination in United States Immigration
Law
Two provisions in the current INA are used to exclude and deport indi-
viduals for consensual homosexual conduct and expression: the "crimes
involving moral turpitude" exclusion,8 8 and the requirement that an
alien prove "good moral character" in order to become a citizen or to
qualify for certain benefits such as voluntary departure. 89 An alien con-
victed of a crime of moral turpitude (or who admits to acts constituting
such an offense) can be excluded or deported9 ° under the crimes involv-
ing moral turpitude provision. Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude automatically bars a finding of good moral character.
9 1
Neither of these provisions explicitly singles out homosexual sexual
activity as such. It is only because the INS and most courts interpret
sodomy and public morality offenses as crimes of moral turpitude that
these provisions have a disparate impact on lesbians and gay men. This
section provides a history of these two provisions and of their use
against lesbians and gay men.
A. The "Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude" Exclusion
1. History of the Exclusion
The 1891 Act first used the term "moral turpitude" to exclude "persons
who have been convicted of a felony or .. . crime or misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude." 92 Subsequent statutes retained the exclu-
87. In testimony before Congress in 1983, Abby Rubenfeld of Lamdba Legal
Defense & Education Fund anticipated this problem, expressing concern that even if
the categorical exclusion of lesbians and gay men was abolished, the crimes involving
moral turpitude provision would continue to be interpreted in a discriminatory fash-
ion. Exclusion and Deportation Amendments of 1983, supra note 1, at 213-15.
88. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (1988 & Supp. II
1990).
89. To be eligible for citizenship, a lawful permanent resident must prove good
moral character for the five year period preceding her application. INA § 316(a), 8
U.S.C. § 1427 (a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). Aliens must also prove good moral char-
acter to qualify for suspension of deportation and for voluntary departure, a form of
relief that allows an alien to leave the United States without an order of deportation
and thus to avoid the five year waiting period for re-entry imposed on those who have
been formally deported. INA § 244(a) & (e)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) & (e)(l) (1988 &
Supp. II 1990). Good moral character is also required for registry, a form of relief
from deportation available to certain aliens for whom there is no record of lawful
admission. INA § 249(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1259(c) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
90. INA §§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (exclusion) & 241(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (deportation), 8
U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) & 1251(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (1988 &
Supp. 1990).
91. INA § 101(0(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(0(3) (1988 & Supp. 1990) lists conviction or
admission of a crime of moral turpitude among the factors that automatically bar a
finding of good moral character.
92. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084.
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sion,9 s and the 1952 Act expanded it to cover individuals who admitted
to acts that constituted a crime involving moral turpitude, even in the
absence of a conviction.94 The 1990 Act retained moral turpitude as a
ground of exclusion, barring the entry of any alien who commits or
admits to acts constituting a crime of moral turpitude for which the max-
imum penalty is at least one year, or which resulted in a sentence of at
least six months.9 5
The concept of crimes involving moral turpitude is also important
for deportation purposes. Since 1891, persons who were excludable at
the time of entry are also subject to deportation.96 Under current law,
any person who was excludable under the crimes involving moral turpi-
tude exclusion at the time of entry is subject to deportation at any time
thereafter, with no statute of limitations.9 7
Since 1917, U.S. immigration law has also included additional spe-
cific deportation provisions based on crimes involving moral turpi-
tude.98 Under both the 1952 and the 1990 Acts, persons who commit a
crime of moral turpitude before entering the country are excludable.99
If they manage to avoid exclusion and gain entry, they are deportable at
any time and remain so indefinitely, with no statute of limitations.
Those who commit even a single crime of moral turpitude within five
years of entering the United States are deportable.10 0 Those who com-
93. See Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213; Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch.
1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898; and Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 889.
94. The 1952 Act excluded "[a]liens who have been convicted of a crime involv-
ing moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense), or aliens who admit having
committed such a crime, or aliens who admit committing acts which constitute the
essential elements of such a crime." INA § 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1988).
The Senate Report noted that "[u]nder this change, immigration officers charged
with administering the law will be able to determine from the information supplied
by the alien whether he falls within the 'criminal' category of excludables, notwith-
standing the fact that there may be no record of conviction or admission of the com-
mission of a specific offense." S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1952).
95. INA §§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) & (ii)(II), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) & (ii)(II)
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
96. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.
97. INA § 241(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1)(B) (1988 & Supp. II) ("Any alien
who at the time of entry or adjustment of status was within one or more of the classes
of aliens excludable by the law existing at such time is deportable").
98. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 889 (providing for deportation of
any alien sentenced to a prison term of a year or more for the conviction "of a crime
involving moral turpitude committed within five years after ... entry" or sentenced
more than once to such a term for conviction "of any crime involving moral turpi-
tude, committed at any time after entry").
99. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (1988 & Supp. II
1990).
100. INA § 241(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (1988 & Supp. II
1990) provides for the deportation of any alien who "is convicted of a crime involv-
ing moral turpitude committed within five years after the date of entry, and either is
sentenced to confinement or is confined therefor in a prison or correctional institu-
tion for one year or longer."
Under the so-called "re-entry doctrine," the word "entry" in the INA refers to
every entry, not just to the first one. Thus, every alien (including those who are
permanent residents) is subject to the grounds of exclusion every time she leaves the
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mit more than one crime of moral turpitude after entry are deportable at
any time, again with no statute of limitations.' 0 '
The decision as to whether a particular offense involves moral turpi-
tude is almost wholly within the discretion of the INS and the courts.
U.S. immigration law has never defined or provided guidelines to iden-
tify a crime of moral turpitude. 10 2 Although the concept of moral turpi-
tude has a long legal history and appears in a variety of legal
contexts,1 03 it has no fixed content. As a leading immigration treatise
notes, "[m]oral turpitude hardly can be characterized as a precise and
easily defined term. Indeed, its flexibility apparently evinces a design to
accomodate the legislative command of changing norms of behav-
ior."1 0 4 In 1950, the Senate Judiciary Committee considered and ulti-
mately rejected the argument that the concept of moral turpitude gives
judges and immigration officials, especially consular officers, too much
discretion in determining which crimes involve moral turpitude. 10 5 In
1951, the Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the term is so
country and returns to the U.S. United States e rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422
(1933). There is an exception to the re-entry doctrine if the alien's absence from the
U.S. was "brief, casual and innocent," and did not "meaningfully interrupt his con-
tinuous physical presence." Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963). The interac-
tion of the re-entry doctrine and the crimes involving moral turpitude exclusion
means that an alien in the United States who commits a crime of moral turpitude,
subsequently leaves the country and then attempts to re-enter would be excludable.
101. INA § 241(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)
provides that "[any alien who at any time after entry is convicted of two or more
crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal mis-
conduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of whether the con-
victions were in a single trial, is deportable."
102. See ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 4, at 513-17 (discussing statutory history
of moral turpitude and noting that lack of statutory definition has left interpretation
to the courts).
103. Moral turpitude is used as a standard of conduct in the disbarment of attor-
neys, revocation of licenses, impeachment of witnesses, and termination of municipal
employment. The definition and use of the term in any of these contexts, however, is
not necessarily binding in an immigration law context. See ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN,
supra note 4, at 522.
104. C. Gordon & H. Rosenfeld, IA IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 4 (rev. ed.
1987). The Foreign Affairs Manual defines moral turpitude as:
[A]nything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals; an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted
and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. Moral turpitude
implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact whether it is pun-
ishable by law. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must
be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by
statute, fixes the moral turpitude.
9 FAM 40.7(a)(9), N4.2.
105. The American consul at Marseille, France, stated that while the visa
instructions define moral turpitude as an act which in itself is one of baseness,
vileness, or depravity, the applicability of the excluding provision often
depends on what the individual officer considers to be baseness, vileness, or
depravity. He suggested that there be a listing of crimes and circumstances
comprehended within the meaning of moral turpitude.
S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 351 (1950).
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vague and meaningless that it constitutes a violation of due process. l0 6
The 1952 Act incorporated the concept and the 1990 Act retained it
without further discussion. 10 7
Deskite the uncertainty surrounding the definition of moral turpi-
tude, certain aspects of its application in the immigration context are
settled. State Department regulations specify that the acts in question
must be criminal in the jurisdiction in which they took place.' 0 8 Con-
versely, a foreign conviction can serve as a basis for a finding of moral
turpitude only if the underlying conduct is also criminal by U.S. stan-
dards.' 0 9 State Department regulations also stipulate that "[a] determi-
nation that a crime involves moral turpitude shall be based upon the
moral standards generally prevailing in the United States."" 10 How to
identify and define these moral standards is left to the courts, who must
determine whether or not an offense involves conduct that is inherently
immoral. As the BIA recently reaffirmed, "[m]oral turpitude is a nebu-
lous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public
conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the
rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either
one's fellow man or society in general.""'i l
It is also well settled that the circumstances surrounding the com-
mission of the offense are not relevant to a finding of moral turpitude.
The relevant issue is whether the
law inherently involves moral turpitude... If we find that the violation of
the law under any and all circumstances involves moral turpitude, we must
conclude that all convictions under that law involved moral turpitude
although 'the particular acts evidence no immorality.' If, on the other
hand, we find that the law punishes acts which do not involve moral turpi-
tude as well as those which do involve moral turpitude, we must rule that
no conviction under that law involves moral turpitude, although in the
particular instance conduct was immoral. 1 12
106. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 222 (holding that case law provides the term
with sufficient definiteness).
107. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
108. [B]efore a finding of ineligibility under INA § 212(a)(9) may be made
because of an admission of the commission of acts which constitute the essen-
tial elements of a crime involving moral turpitude, it must first be established
that the acts constitute a crime under the criminal law of the jurisdiction
where they occurred.
22 CFR 40.7(a)(9)(i).
109. Matter of Ramirez-Rivero, 18 I. & N. Dec. 135 (BIA 1981).
110. 22 CFR 40.7(a)(9)(i).
11. Matter of Short, Int. Dec. 3125 (BIA 1989).
112. Matter of R., 6 I. & N. Dec. 444, 448 (BIA 1954) (emphasis in original). In
Castle v. INS, 541 F.2d 1064, 1066 n.5 (4th Cir. 1976), the court explained:
Congress did not intend to saddle the Immigration Service and the courts
with the extremely difficult and time-consuming burden of developing the
facts surrounding the commission of the crime for which the alien was con-
victed. An alien is subject to deportation under the statute for his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, not for his commission of an act involv-
ing moral turpitude. The focus of the statute is on the type of crime commit-
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Only when a statute encompasses some offenses that involve moral tur-
pitude and some that do not may the court inquire into the facts and
circumstances of the conviction. And even then, the court may only con-
sult the record of conviction to determine the specific offense
committed. 113
2. Impact on Lesbians and Gay Men
Since the 1952 Act introduced language specifically designed to exclude
homosexuals,1 14 judicial interpretation of the crimes involving moral
turpitude exclusion has been heavily influenced by the categorical exclu-
sion of lesbians and gay men under the 1952 Act. In theory, the require-
ment that every possible offense under a statute must involve moral
turpitude is a demanding standard." 15 In practice, however, when con-
fronted with broad public morality statutes that criminalize a wide range
of conduct, courts have routinely held that only those offenses that
involve homosexual conduct are crimes of moral turpitude. In a 1959
case, for example, the Second Circuit upheld the deportation of a man
convicted of homosexual solicitation under a New York disorderly con-
duct statute that also encompassed many other specific offenses.1 1 6
ted rather than on the factual context surrounding the actual commission of
the offense.
See also U.S. v. Neelly, 208 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1953); Okabe v. INS, 671 F.2d 863 (5th
Cir 1982); Matter of Esfandiary, 16 1. & N. Dec. 659 (BIA 1979); Matter of Short, Int.
Dec. 3125 (BIA 1989).
113. Matter of Esfandiary, 16 I. & N. Dec. 659 (BIA 1979); Matter of Short, Int.
Dec. 3125 (BIA 1989).
114. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
The 1917 Act excluded persons of "constitutional psychopathic inferiority," but
this provision does not seem to have been drafted with homosexuality in mind and
was not used to exclude lesbians or gay men before 1952. Pub. L. No. 64-30 1, § 3, 39
Stat. 874-75 (1917). In a 1946 case, for instance, a permanent resident who entered
the United States from Canada in 1926 was convicted of "committing an unnatural
and lascivious act with a male person" in Massachusetts in 1938, and with "open and
gross lewdness and lascivious behavior in the presence of two males" in Massachu-
setts in 1943. On the basis of these two convictions, he was ordered deported under
the 1917 Act, "on the ground that he has been sentenced more than once to impris-
onment for a term of 1 year or more for the commission subsequent to entry of a
crime involving moral turpitude." The possiblity that he might be deportable under
the "constitutional psychopathic inferior" provision was not raised. Matter ofJ., 2 I.
& N. Dec. 533 (BIA 1946). See also Matter of W., 5 I. & N. Dec. 578 (1953) (deporting
alien under 1917 Act for admission to crime of gross indecency); Note, The Propriety of
Denying Entry to Homosexual Aliens: Examining the Public Health Service's Authority Over
Medical Exclusions, 17 U. MicH. J. L. REF. 331, 333-34 (1984) (noting BIA's exclusive
reliance on "moral turpitude" provision to exclude homosexuals prior to 1952).
After 1952, some courts retroactively interpreted the 1917 Act to exclude homo-
sexuals who entered the country before 1952. See infra notes 123-34, 135 and accom-
panying text.
115. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
116. Babouris v. Esperdy, 269 F.2d 621, 621-22 (2d Cir. 1959). The New York
Penal Code provided in relevant part that anyone who "[f]requents or loiters about
any public place soliciting men for the purpose of committing a crime against nature
or other lewdness; ... shall be deemed to have committed the offense of disorderly
conduct." Id. at 621.
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"We do not hold . . . or even suggest or intimate," the concurrence
specified, "that a conviction for violation of any of the other paragraphs
of this broad state statute . . . is a ground for deportation under the
Federal Act."' 17
Similarly, because the "psychopathic personality" provision author-
ized exclusion based on sexual orientation alone, courts have readily
found evidence of moral turpitude in convictions involving homosexual
conduct even when offenders were charged under vague statutes that
did not define the proscribed behavior and even when the conduct
criminalized lacked the elements of violence or abusiveness present in
other sexual crimes deemed to involve moral turpitude. In a 1956 case,
for instance, a permanent resident who entered the country in 1947 had
been convicted of "gross indecency" in Toronto in 1940.118 Reversing
the immigration judge's order of deportation, the BIA initially held that
he could not be denied admission for committing a crime of moral turpi-
tude because the statute failed to provide any definition of "gross inde-
cency."119 In fact, neither the statute nor the record of arrest revealed
anything about the acts involved beyond the fact that they took place
between the defendant and another man. 120
On appeal, however, the INS argued that, regardless of whether the
statute defined an offense of moral turpitude, the conviction "provided a
substantial basis for concluding that the respondent was inadmissible on
medical grounds" as a homosexual. 12 1 Although the BIA did not
endorse this argument directly, it reversed its earlier decision and rein-
stated the order of deportation, summarily concluding that because all
reported cases under the offense of gross indecency involved moral tur-
pitude, it was permissible to assume that the case at issue did so as well.
Remarkably, the BIA did not discuss the fact that all of the reported
cases cited involved acts of sexual assault against children or minors. 122
117. Id. at 622-23. Accord Hudson v. Esperdy, 290 F.2d 879 (2d Cir. 1961) (citing
Babouris to uphold deportation of two men convicted of homosexual solicitation
under New York disorderly conduct statute), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 918 (1961); Wyn-
gaard v. Kennedy, 295 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 926 (1961);
Matter of P., 9 I. & N. Dec. 293 (BIA 1961) (citing Babouris to order deportation of
individual convicted of disorderly conduct for homosexual acts under New York stat-
ute); Matter of Alfonso-Bermudez, Int. Dec. 1733 (BIA 1967) (holding that disor-
derly conduct conviction for homosexual acts under similarly broad California
disorderly conduct statute involved moral turpitude).
118. Matter of H., 7 I. & N. Dec. 359, 359-60 (BIA 1956).
119. Id. at 360. In so holding, the BIA was following its own precedent in a 1945
case involving the same homosexual offense under the same Canadian statute. Mat-
ter of Z., 2 I. & N. Dec. 316, 316-17 (BIA 1945) (no crime of moral turpitude because
statute does not define "gross indecency"). Ordinarily, the terms of the offense as
defined in the statute are alone dispositive of whether or not a crime involves moral
turpitude. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
120. Matter of H., 7 I. & N. Dec. 359 at 360 (noting that "the record of conviction
was of no assistance in ascertaining the exact act of gross indecency which was
involved").
121. Id. at 360.
122. Id. at 360-61.
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Given the legislative exclusion of lesbians and gay men under the "psy-
chopathic personality" provision, the equation of homosexuality and
child abuse required no further justification.
As this case suggests, the "crimes involving moral turpitude" provi-
sion and the categorical exclusion of homosexuals were mutually rein-
forcing-if the evidence supporting one provision was insufficient, the
same evidence could often be used to mobilize the other in its stead. In
cases involving a homosexual offense, as the Flores-Rodriguez 123 case
made clear in 1956, the INS could use the conviction as a crime of moral
turpitude, as evidence of homosexuality, or as both. Roberto Flores-
Rodriguez had twice been convicted of disorderly conduct (specifically,
of soliciting sex with men in a public place) in New York City.124 The
case turned on whether his concealment of these convictions in a visa
application was material to his admissibility under the 1917 Act, the law
in effect at the time of his entry. 125 "We hold," the majority opinion
concluded, "that by the defendant's untrue answer ... the [consular
officer] was not put on notice to investigate, and we think an investiga-
tion could have proved that the immigrant was within one of the
excluded classes."i 26
The majority held Flores-Rodriguez excludable under crimes of the
moral turpitude provision, rejecting his argument that New York State's
characterization of the act as an "offense" rather than a "crime"
exempted him from the provision. 127 Less predictably, the majority also
held him excludable under the "constitutional psychopathic inferior"
and "mental defective" exclusions of the 1917 Act. 128 The opinion
acknowledged the absence of any evidence that the drafters of the 1917
Act meant to include homosexuality under either category. 129 Nonethe-
less, repelled by what it deemed "the defendant's exhibitionistic anti-
social proclivities," the majority equated the meanings of the 1917 and
1952 Acts and analyzed the defendant's conduct in terms of the contem-
porary psychiatric theories embodied in the 1952 "psychopathic person-
ality" provision.130 "It cannot be supposed," the majority concluded,
"that Congress did not intend to include such undesirables within the
excluded classes of immigrants."'13
In an influential opinion,' 3 2 the concurrence took issue with the
majority's conflation of the 1917 and 1952 Acts, and with its reliance on
psychiatric texts instead of legislative history. Anticipating the 1967
123. 237 F.2d 405 (2nd Cir. 1956).
124. Id. at 407.
125. Id. at 408-09.
126. Id. at 409.
127. Id. at 409-10.
128. Id. at 410-12.
129. Id. at 410.
130. Id. at 410-12.
131. Id. at 412.
132. See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court holding in Boutilier,'33 the concurrence was alert to the
potential dangers of tying the legal meaning of homosexuality in U.S.
immigration law too closely to its far more complex and elusive meaning
in psychiatric discourse. Regardless of psychiatric terms and theories,
the concurrence argued, the legislative history of the 1952 Act clearly
evinced an intent to exclude homosexuals. In its haste to find an under-
lying psychiatric rationale that would exclude homosexuals under the
language of both the 1917 and the 1952 Acts, the majority ran the risk of
placing the legal interpretation of the Act at the mercy of shifts in psy-
chiatric theory.13 4
Ironically, the disagreement between the majority opinion and the
concurrence in Flores-Rodriguez allowed courts greater flexibility in inter-
preting the two Acts and actually made the exclusion of homosexuals
easier. In cases governed by the pre-1952 law, courts could cite the
majority opinion's psychiatric rationale to authorize using a homosexual
offense as evidence of "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" under
the 1917 Act. 13 5 In cases governed by the 1952 Act, courts could cite
the concurrence to bypass the ambiguities of clinical discourse about
homosexuality and use convictions of homosexual offenses as proof of a
"psychopathic personality" under the 1952 law.
In Matter of S.,136 for example, a lawful permanent resident who
entered in 1952 was arrested and convicted in 1958 for soliciting a male
police officer. The immigration judge found him deportable under the
"crimes involving moral turpitude" provision, but not under the "psy-
chopathic personality" provision. 137 The BIA, however, found him
deportable on both counts despite conflicting expert testimony as to his
homosexual tendencies. The PHS psychiatrist certified him as a "psy-
chopathic personality with pathologic sexuality," but his own treating
psychiatrist argued that he should be classifed as neurotic rather than
psychopathic.' 3 8 The Board cited the concurrence from Flores-Rodriguez
in support of its conclusion that courts need not become entangled in
the subtleties of psychiatric disputes about the origin and treatment of
homosexuality.' 3 9 Under the 1952 Act, the fact that he was convicted of
a homosexual offense and admitted to a history of homosexual acts was
enough to bring him within the legal meaning of "psychopathic
133. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
134. Flores-Rodriquez, 237 F.2d at 412-16 (Frank, J., concurring):
I think it a mistake for my colleagues needlessly to embark-without a pilot,
rudder, compass or radar--on an amateur's voyage on the fog-enshrouded
sea of psychiatry .... [T]he government... asks us to read into the 1917 Act
the definitions which Congress adopted 35 years later-of the new language
of the 1952 Act. This, of course, we cannot do.
135. See, e.g., Matter of Rochelle, I 1 1. & N. Dec. 436 (BIA 1965) (holding that
"constitutional psychopathic inferiority" includes homosexuality).
136. 8 I. & N. Dec. 409, 410 (BIA 1959).
137. Id at 409-10.
138. Id. at 410-15.
139. Id. at 414-15 (citing Flores-Rodriguez concurrence).
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personality."' 140
In sum, although the 1990 Act eliminated the provision used to
exclude lesbians and gay men because of their sexual orientation, judi-
cial interpretation of the crimes of moral turpitude exclusion has been
deeply marked by the 1952 Act, and the assumption that sodomy and
public morality offenses are crimes of moral turpitude has become
embedded in existing case law. Courts have interpreted the crimes of
moral turpitude exclusion in the harsh light of the categorical exclusion
of lesbians and gay men under the 1952 Act, interpreting convictions of
homosexual offenses both as crimes of moral turpitude and as short-
hand proof of "psychopathic personality."
B. "Good Moral Character" Requirement
1. History of the Requirement
The requirement that an alien seeking citizenship prove that he or she is
of "good moral character" has been a constant feature of U.S. immigra-
tion law since the first naturalization statute of 1790.141 A finding of
good moral character is also a prerequisite to voluntary departure and
other benefits under U.S. immigration law. 14 2 The burden of proving
good moral character is on the alien. 143 Congress has offered only very
sketchy guidance about how to define good moral character, and, as with
"moral turpitude," the courts have interpreted the term at their own
discretion. 14 4
140. As the court noted:
The record shows that respondent is definitely within the class of 'homosexu-
als,' as the term is commonly understood, and within the contemplation of
the law. Within Dr. A__'s psychiatric parlance respondent may not be a true
homosexual, but .... If this man is not a homosexual, we would find it diffi-
cult to hold that anyone is a homosexual.
Id. at 415. Accord, Quiroz v. Neelly, 291 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1961) (deporting lesbian
as "a psychopathic personality" despite testimony from two psychiatrists that she was
not "psychopathic").
The use of homosexual offenses or admissions of homosexual acts as proof of
homosexuality and thus of excludability was further solidified when the Supreme
Court endorsed the position of the Flores-Rodriguez concurrence in Boutijer, supra
notes 58-62 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Lavoie v. INS, 418 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.
1969) (citing Boutilier to uphold deportation of man convicted of "a lewd, obscene,
and indecent act" as a homosexual, despite court's recognition that he might not be
classified as a homosexual under "scientific psychological standards").
141. More precisely, the 1790 Act required that an alien be of "good character."
Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103. The 1795 Act required "good moral
character," the language that has been used ever since. Act ofJan. 29, 1795, ch. 20,§§ 1-2, 1 Stat. 414. See INA § 316(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. II
1990) (requiring proof of good moral character in the five year period preceding the
naturalization petition).
142. See supra note 89.
143. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929); Berenyi v. District Direc-
tor, 385 U.S. 630 (1967).
144. In 1952, Congress attempted to clarify the good moral character requirement
by providing a non-exhaustive list of persons automatically barred from proving
good moral character. This list did not include homosexuals, but it did include per-
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Since the 1950s, most courts have adopted the "common con-
science" test developed by Judge Learned Hand in the 1930's and
40's.14 5 Rejecting an earlier standard that denied a finding of good
moral character to anyone convicted of criminal conduct under state or
federal law,' 46 Judge Hand sought to achieve more consistency in the
enforcement of U.S. immigration law by judging good moral character
according to a uniform national standard, defined as a national moral
consensus or "the moral feelings, now prevalent generally in this coun-
try." 1 4 7 Some other courts have chosen to locate the relevant "common
conscience" at the state or local community level. 148 Regardless of how
the relevant community is defined, however, courts retain enormous dis-
cretion in defining and applying the "common conscience" standard. 149
The result, despite Judge Hand's intention to create more uniformity,
has been an unpredictable patchwork of conflicting caselaw. 150
2. Relation to Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude Provision
The crimes involving moral turpitude provision and the good moral
character requirement are closely related. In 1952, Congress drafted a
non-exhaustive list of behaviors that automatically barred a finding of
good moral character, including conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude.' 5 1 As a result, an alien convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude is also barred from a finding of good moral character,
although the conviction must take place within the statutory five year
sons convicted of a crime of moral turpitude. INA §§ 101(f)(l)-(8), 8 U.S.c.
§§ 1101(f)(1)-(8) (1988).
145. Judge Hand first used the term "common conscience" in Schmidt v. United
States, 177 F.2d 450-51 (2d Cir. 1949). See also Posusta v. United States, 285 F.2d
533, 535 (2d Gir. 1961) (Learned Hand, J.) (determining good moral character
according to the "ethical standards current at the time" of the application). On the
adoption of Judge Hand's standard by other courts, see Note, Naturalization and the
Adjudication of Good Moral Character. An Exercise in judicial Uncertainty, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV.
545, 551-57 (1972) [hereinafterJudicial Uncertainty]; Steven L. Strange, Private Consen-
sual Sexual Conduct and the "Good Moral Character" Requirement of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 357, 361-65 (1975).
146. See, e.g., Estrin v. United States, 80 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1935) (denying naturali-
zation to petitioner who had committed adultery in violation of state law and local
community standards). For a summary of the case law using this standard, see Note,
Good Moral Character in Naturalization Proceedings, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 622, 623-24
(1948).
147. United States v. Francisco, 164 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1947).
148. See, e.g., Petition of B., 154 F. Supp. 633, 633-34 (D. Md. 1957).
149. As Judge Hand readily acknowledged, "it is a test incapable of exact defini-
tion; the best we can do is improvise the response that the 'ordinary' man or woman
would make, if the question were put whether the conduct was consistent with 'good
moral character'." Posusta, 285 F.2d at 535.
150. Numerous commentators have criticized the subjectivity and inconsistency of
the caselaw on good moral character. See Strange, supra note 145;Judicial Uncertainty,
supra note 145; Lisa H. Newton, On Coherence in the Law: A Study of the "Good Moral
Character" Requirement of the Naturalization Statute, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 40 (1972); Comment,
Morality Under Naturalization and Immigration Acts, 1 DEPAUL L. REV. 125 (1951).
151. See supra note 144.
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period preceding the petition for naturalization. 152 The converse, how-
ever, is not true for even criminal behavior that bars a finding of good
moral character is not necessarily deemed morally turpitudinous. 153
3. Impact on Lesbians and Gay Men
When the courts adopted Judge Hand's common conscience standard,
they also tended to adopt his relatively liberal view of private sexual con-
duct.154 In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Judge Hand ruled that
neither "promiscuous" sexual activity between unmarried heterosexuals
nor adulterous heterosexual relationships necessarily barred a finding of
good moral character,' 55 and most courts readily followed his lead. In
general, courts took the position that only private sexual behavior that
threatened social institutions such as marriage and the family should bar
a finding of good moral character. 156 The guiding principle was "to
admit as citizens those who are likely to prove law-abiding and use-
ful.'1 57 The judge in a 1958 California case summed up the increas-
ingly liberal judicial view of private sexual conduct as follows:
The satisfaction of sexual appetite is a peculiarly private matter, ordina-
rily concerning only the participants in the sexual act. It becomes a mat-
ter of official concern when some statute of the United States or of a State
is violated. Otherwise, it will be treated by courts as an act of immorality
if it be commercialized, as in the case of prostitution, or if illegitimate
children are begotten. Likewise, open [sic] flaunting publicly what should
152. INA § 101(0(3), 8 U.S.C. 1101(0(3) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (stating that the
offense must have taken place within the five year period preceding the naturalization
petition).
153. E.g., INA § 101(0(4)-(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(0(4)-(5) (1988 & Supp. 1990) states
that any person "whose income derives primarily from illegal gambling activities" or
"who has been convicted of two or more gambling offenses" is barred from a finding
of good moral character, but the BIA has held that gambling is not a crime of moral
turpitude. Matter of Gaglioti, 10 I. & N. Dec. 719 (BIA 1964); Matter of S., 9 I. & N.
Dec. 688 (BIA 1962).
154. See, e.g., Petition of Anzalone, 107 F. Supp. 770, 770-71 (D.NJ. 1952) (noting
that "[a] more liberal view of sexual behavior has been taken by the courts in the past
decade when passing on the moral character of petitioners for naturalization").
155. Schmidt v. United States, 177 F2d. 450, 452 (9th Cir. 1949)
(We have answered in the negative the question whether an unmarried man
must live completely celibate, or forfeit his claim to a 'good moral character';
but .... those were cases of continuous, though adulterous, union. We have
now to say whether it makes a critical difference that the alien's lapses are
casual, concupiscent and promiscuous, but not adulterous .... so far as we
can divine anything so tenebrous and impalpable as the common conscience,
these added features do not make a critical difference.);
Petitions of Rudder, 159 F.2d 695, 697-98 (2d Cir. 1947) (granting naturalization in
a series of cases in which the petitioners were in longterm adulterous relationships
because of failure or inability to adjust previous marital status through divorce). See
also infra notes 296-98 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Petition of Anzalone, 107 F. Supp. at 771 (noting that "we must not
forget that our civilization is built around a family relation which should be held as
sacred as possible if we are not to become an amoral people").
157. Posusta v. United States, 285 F.2d 533, 536 (2d Cir. 1961) (Learned Hand,
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be a private matter of promiscuity might adversely affect a petitioner's
standing as a moral person. 158
Before the early 1970's, however, courts were not willing to extend
this liberal view to include private homosexual behavior. In part, this
unwillingness stemmed from the fact that most states had sodomy stat-
utes that criminalized sex between persons of the same gender. Illegal-
ity aside, however, courts also held that homosexuality in and of itself
barred a finding of good moral character. In 1968, for instance, a New
York court applied Judge Hand's standard to a lesbian seeking naturali-
zation after living and working in the United States for fourteen years.
The woman testified to having had a series of sexual relationships with
women, both before her entry into the country and after. Citing a New
Jersey court that found "[flew behavioral deviations ... more offensive
to American mores than ... homosexuality," the New York court dis-
missed the woman's petition for citizenship despite the fact that her
behavior was private and violated no law. 159
Beginning in the early 1970's, however, a series of landmark cases
held that private homosexual activity did not bar a finding of good moral
character for immigration purposes. In 1971, a district judge in New
York applied Judge Hand's test of "the ethical standards current at the
time" to the case of Manuel Labady, an openly gay Cuban man petition-
ing for naturalization.' 60 The court emphasized that
all of his sexual acts have taken place in privacy, behind locked doors in
hotel rooms. He has never engaged in such activity in any park, theatre,
subway station, or any other public or semi-public place .... There is no
suggestion that his homosexual activities could harm a marriage
relationship. 161
Citing the recent extension of the constitutional right of sexual privacy
in Griswold,'62 the court held that
the most important factor to be considered is whether the challenged
conduct is public or private in nature. If it is public or if it involves a large
number of other persons, it may pose a threat to the community. If, on
the other hand, it is entirely private, the likelihood of harm to others is
158. In re Kielblock, 163 F. Supp. 687, 687-88 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (refusing to deny a
finding of good moral character to woman who had sexual relationship with married
man).
159. In re Schmidt, 56 Misc. 2d 456, 459-60 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961)
(Although the conduct of petitioner was not such as to be violative of any
criminal statute, and although her activities were confined to her home and
with persons with whom she lived, her admitted practices of these sexual
deviations continually during the five years preceding the filing of her peti-
tion, are not, in the court's opinion, consistent with good moral character as
the 'ordinary man or woman sees it.)
The court also cited the 1965 amendment to the INA excluding "sexual deviates."
Id. at 459.
160. In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
161. Id. at 926.
162. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that states may not
prohibit sale of contraceptives).
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minimal and any effort to regulate or penalize the conduct may lead to an
unjustified invasion of the individual's constitutional rights. 163
The court explicitly rejected the INS's argument that Labady had
admitted to acts that violated the New York State sodomy law, and that
this violation should bar a finding of good moral character. 64 The
court argued that the New York statute probably applied only to public
sex,1 6 5 and noted that, in any event, the seriousness of his offense was
comparable to heterosexual fornication, which did not bar a finding of
good moral character despite its illegality in many states. 16 6 Private
consensual sodomy, the court concluded, was no more "a violation of
public morality" than its heterosexual analogue.' 67 The court also sur-
veyed "public attitudes toward private homosexual conduct," and
noticed a growing reluctance to punish private homosexual behavior.168
In 1973, the Second Circuit cited Labady in support of its refusal to
bar an alien petitioning for citizenship on the basis of his homosexuality,
which was demonstrated by a string of past arrests for homosexual
offenses (disorderly conduct and loitering).' 69 Initially, the two cases
seem quite different. Labady involved purely private and, at least in the
court's opinion, legal behavior.170 Kovacs involved a series of arrests for
public sex. Labady had consistently admitted his homosexuality,'
7
'
whereas Kovacs lied to the naturalization examiner about his past sexual
conduct.' 72 On these facts alone, Kovacs seems a startling expansion of
the Labady holding, protecting public as well as private expression of
homosexual identity.
The crucial additional fact, however, is that "there was no proof
that Kovacs had engaged in any homosexual acts, public or private,
within the statutory five year period of residence immediately preceding
his petition."' 73 Because of this absence of public offenses within the
relevant five year period, the original hearing examiner recommended
naturalization despite his suspicion that Kovacs had lied about his
"homosexual proclivities" in the past.' 74 At the final hearing, the immi-
gration judge rejected the recommendation and denied the petition, cit-
163. Labady, 326 F. Supp. at 927.
164. Id. at 928.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 929.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 929-30.
169. Kovacs v. United States, 476 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1973).
170. See supra notes 160-68 and accompanying text.
171. Labady, 326 F. Supp. at 925-26 ("Petitioner was a homosexual in Cuba and
made this fact known to the Service authorities when he entered this country at the
age of 14.").
172. Kovacs, 476 F.2d at 843-44.
173. Id. at 844. The statute provides that an alien need only prove good moral
character for the five-year period preceding his petition for naturalization. See supra
note 141.
174. Kovacs, 476 F.2d at 844.
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ing Kovac's "lack of candor." The Second Circuit upheld the denial, but
carefully noted that
[p]etitioner is not being denied naturalization for his sexual activities-
but rather for his lack of candor under oath.... if his apparently exem-
plary public behavior continues, a greater exhibition of candor at a later
date might well lead to a different result in his efforts to become a
citizen. 175
In the end, Kovacs reaffirmed the emerging position that protection
should be afforded only to private homosexual behavior.
In 1975, the Oregon District Court agreed in In re Brodie that private
homosexual behavior did not violate the "common conscience" of the
local community and thus did not automatically bar a finding of good
moral character. 176 The court stressed that Brodie's homosexual iden-
tity was a private one, and emphasized the similarity between his behav-
ior and that of similarly situated heterosexuals. 17 7 The court cited
evidence of growing acceptance of homosexuality in Oregon, and held
that "the community regards homosexual behavior between consenting
adults with tolerance, if not indifference."' 17 8
One circumstance that had not yet been directly raised in this line of
cases was that in which the alien seeking naturalization had been con-
victed or admitted to acts constituting a violation under a state sodomy
law. The Labady court avoided this issue by holding that the New York
statute did not apply to private consensual behavior.' 7 9 In Kovacs, there
had been no conviction of any homosexual offense during the five-year
residence period relevant under the naturalization statute.18 0 In Brodie,
Oregon had decriminalized consensual sodomy. 18 ' A gay or lesbian
alien who sought naturalization in a state with an enforceable sodomy
statute, especially one that made sodomy a felony, would directly raise
the issue of whether consensual homosexual sex was a crime involving
175. Id. at 845 (emphasis added).
176. In re Brodie, 394 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Or. 1975). The case concerned the natu-
ralization petition of a gay man honorably discharged from the U.S. military for
"homosexual acts." The INS argued that Brodie would have been excludable under
§ 212(a)(4) when he entered the country, and that he could therefore not possibly
meet the burden of proving good moral character. The court held that excludability
at the time of entry did not automatically bar a finding of good moral character, and
held itself bound to make an "independent factual determination of good moral
character." Id. at 1208-09. Citing Kovacs and Labady, the court had "little difficulty
finding that Brodie's conduct is acceptable by the ethical standards of the year 1975."
Id. at 1209-10.
177. Id. at 1209-10:
Although his partners have been men, his social and sexual behavior has not
otherwise differed from that of many other persons 28 years old. Like most
people, he is not sexually involved with minors. He does not use threat or
fraud. He does not take or give money. Nor does he engage in sexual activ-
ity in parks, theaters, or any public places.
178. Id. at 1210.
179. See supra note 165.
180. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
181. In re Brodie, 394 F. Supp 1208, 1210 (D. Or. 1975).
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moral turpitude that would bar a finding of good moral character. The
1980 case of Nemetz v. INS 18 2 finally brought this issue to the fore.
Horst Nemetz was a West German citizen who entered the United
States in 1967 as a lawful permanent resident of Virginia, and who had
owned and operated a successful business for several years.' 8 3 When he
petitioned for naturalization in 1976, the INS examiner questioned him
extensively about his sexual activities with his male roommate. Nemetz
revealed that he had sex with his roommate, but that he had never had
or solicited sex in public. 184 Although Nemetz refused to answer ques-
tions about specific sexual acts, the INS examiner inferred that he had
violated Virginia's sodomy statute, and had therefore committed a crime
involving moral turpitude.' 8 5 The district court and the Court of
Appeals both accepted this inference.' 86
The Court of Appeals focused on the relatively unique status of pri-
vate consensual sodomy as behavior that is criminalized in some states
and perfectly legal in others. 187 Applying the "common conscience"
standard, the court defined the issue as the appropriateness of using
Virginia state law "to determine whether Nemetz had committed a crime
of moral turpitude, that is, whether it is appropriate to look to state law
to determine the issue of good moral character in naturalization mat-
ters." 188 The court of appeals did not merely argue that the common
conscience standard must be sought at the national rather than the state
or local level. More radically, it contended both that a federal standard
should prevail, and that the federal standard should not take matters of
private sexual morality into account. Citing the constitutional require-
ment of a "uniform rule of naturalization," the court held this require-
ment to mean that "whether a person is of good moral character for
purposes of naturalization is a question of federal law."' 89
Ordinarily, immigration judges look to state criminal law, and the
court acknowledged that, practically speaking, deference to state law
would continue to be appropriate in most cases. "When use of state law
defeats the uniformity requirement, however, the court must devise a
federal standard by other means."190 The court emphasized how rarely
this circumstance will occur, given that state laws define most crimes in a
fairly uniform manner. "The difficulty arises," the court noted, "pri-
marily with respect to private acts which are the subject of radically dif-
ferent legislative treatment by the states." 191 The court denied, in other
182. 647 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1981).
183. Id. at 433, 437.
184. Id. at 433-34.
185. Id. at 434-35.
186. Id. at 435.
187. Id. at 436.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 435-36.
190. Id. at 436.
191. Id. In practice, the only two crimes for which this is the case are sodomy and
adultery. See infra notes 296-305 and accompanying text.
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words, that there is any federal interest in regulating private sexual
behavior, and argued that "It]he appropriate test in such cases is there-
fore whether the act is harmful to the public or is offensive merely to a
personal morality."' 9 2 In short, the court responded to the lack of con-
sensus about the morality of private homosexual behavior by removing
it from the purview of federal immigration law.
4. The Limits of Nemetz
The reach of Nemetz and the cases that preceded it was obviously limited
by the exclusion of homosexuals under the "psychopathic personality"
provision of the 1952 Act. 193 In each case, only a technicality protected
the alien petitioning for naturalization from deportation under this pro-
vision as a person excludable at time of entry. In Labady, the fact that
the petitioner had freely admitted his homosexuality to the INS when he
entered the country at the age of fourteen estopped the INS from
attempting to deport him later. 19 4 The petitioner in Brodie was exempt
from deportation under a provision that gave special protection to indi-
viduals who had served a certain amount of time in the Armed Forces
and received an honorable discharge.1 9 5 In Kovacs, a PHS psychiatrist
had already examined and certified Kovacs as a "psychopathic personal-
ity," and the INS had initiated deportation proceedings.' 9 6 The INS
discontinued the proceedings when the Ninth Circuit held the term
"psychopathic personality" void for vagueness in Fleuti v. Rosenberg.197
In Nemetz, the INS produced no conclusive evidence that Nemetz had
been a certifiable homosexual at the time of his entry.' 9 8 In sum, the
exemption of private homosexual behavior from the good moral charac-
ter analysis only came into play in the relatively infrequent case in which
the alien had managed to avoid exclusion or deportation as a "psycho-
pathic personality."
The reach of Nemetz was also limited in another respect as well, pro-
tecting the expression of lesbian and gay identity only within a very nar-
rowly defined sphere of "privacy." Nemetz explicity held that the federal
government has no interest in the private sexual behavior of homosexu-
als, and that such behavior is irrelevant to an analysis of good moral
character. 99 In delimiting a highly circumscribed sphere of protected
private activity, however, Nemetz simultaneously defined activity in the
192. Nemetz, 647 F.2d at 436.
193. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
194. 326 F. Supp. 924, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
195. 394 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Or. 1975) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1427). The court also
rejected the argument that "the standards for exclusion are congruent with those for
naturalization" and held itself bound "to make an independent factual determination
of good moral character." Id. at 1208.
196. 476 F.2d 843-44 (2d Cir. 1973).
197. Id. See also supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
198. Nemetz testified that he had dated women in Germany prior to his entry into
the United States. 647 F.2d 432, 434-35 (4th Cir. 1981).
199. See supra notes 182-92 and accompanying text.
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public sphere as unprotected, and thereby at least implicitly endorsed
the punishment of public behavior. In practical terms, the message to
lesbian and gay immigrants was to keep their sexual identities strictly
closeted.
The draconian terms of this trade-off are apparent in the extent to
which Nemetz and the cases that precede it emphasized the necessity of
hiding one's homosexual identity from public view to merit protection.
Horst Nemetz was allowed to proceed with his petition for naturalization
only after testifying in response to extensive, persistent, and intrusive
questioning, that he had never "committed a homosexual act in public,"
never "recruited for any type of sexual activities in public," never "been
arrested or been questioned by the police."' 20 0 Translated from legal
jargon, his denial of public activity means that he never made love on a
beach, in a car, in a park, or in any of the other quasi-public places in
which heterosexual couples occasionally engage in sexual relations. His
denial of "recruiting" means that he never sexually propositioned a man
in a bar, at a party, on the street, or anywhere outside of his home. His
denial of ever being arrested or questioned by the police means either
that he was fortunate, or that he avoided gay bars, gay bathhouses, gay
cruising areas in parks and bathrooms, and other places that gay men
informally gather and socialize. It also means that he never had the mis-
fortune of expressing sexual interest to an undercover police officer pos-
ing as a gay man. Nemetz also claimed to have had only one sexual
partner since entering the country. It is only because his sexual behav-
ior was such a model of discretion and circumspection that the court
held that that his "homosexual activity cannot' serve as the basis for a
denial of a finding of good moral character because it has been purely
private, consensual and without harm to the public." 20 1
The portrait of the acceptable lesbian or gay immigrant that
emerges from Nemetz and other cases is one who pursues a life of out-
ward normality, and who passes for straight in his or her public life. In
Labady, the court described the petitioner as a paragon of outward nor-
malcy. Not only have "all of his sexual acts taken place in private behind
locked doors in hotel rooms," the INS stipulated that "he had never
been in trouble, and, as his employer testified, he is highly regarded at
his place of employment." 20 2 The court also cited with approval the
Civil Service Commission policy of excluding only known or public
homosexuals.20 3 In harmony with the principle behind this policy,
Labady received a finding of good moral character because he was a
straight-acting man who did not make his sexual orientation "known,"
and who confined the expression of his sexual identity to secretive sex-
ual encounters in locked hotel rooms. 204
200. Id. at 433-34.
201. Id. at 436.
202. 326 F. Supp. 924, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
203. Id. at 929-30.
204. Id. at 925, 927.
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Finally, Nemetz is also limited by the fact that not all courts have
accepted its analysis of moral turpitude and good moral character. In
Longstaff, the Fifth Circuit rejected this analysis explicitly, excluding a
fifteen year Houston resident who had merely admitted to acts that vio-
lated the Texas sodomy statute under the crimes of moral turpitude
exclusion. 20 5 The court did not consider relevant the fact that Longstaff
had never been convicted, or that his sexual activity had taken place in
private. 20 6 The court explicitly rejected the holding in Nemetz that "it
was inappropriate to look at state law to determine the issue of good
moral character in naturalization matters .... We do not disagree with
the idea of a uniform rule. Rather, we hold that the uniform rule is ...
that of 'good moral character'." 20 7
C. Effect of the 1990 Act
The 1990 Act sliced through the symbiotic relationship between the
''crimes involving moral turpitude" exclusion and the "psychopathic
personality" exclusion by eliminating the latter altogether. 20 8 No
longer can conviction of a sodomy or public morality offense be used as
evidence of homosexual orientation and thus as a means to exclude or
deport an individual on the basis of his or her sexual orientation alone.
Exclusion or deportation must now be based solely on the offense itself,
under the "crimes involving moral turpitude" exclusion.
Before the 1990 Act, some courts adopted a distinction between
private and public expressions of sexual identity, and invested that dis-
tinction with controlling significance on the issue of whether a particular
offense constitutes moral turpitude for the purposes of determining
good moral character. Thus, according to the test articulated by the
Fourth Circuit in 1980 in Nemetz, federal immigration law will no longer
scrutinize purely private homosexual behavior, even when that behavior
results in a conviction under state law. Only public morality offenses
that target public or quasi-public behavior will be scrutinized to deter-
mine whether or not they involve moral turpitude.20 9
Now that the 1990 Act has eliminated the provision used to exclude
individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation, the rationale behind
this public-private distinction has disappeared. So long as U.S. immi-
gration law refused to admit openly lesbian and gay people, distinguish-
ing between individuals who concealed their sexual identity and those
who did not represented an intelligible, humane, and within obvious
limits, principled attempt to soften the homophobic bias of the law with-
out violating its letter. But now that Congress has lifted the ban on les-
bian and gay immigrants, the distinction between private and public
offenses has become an irrational vestige of the pre-1990 law, and
205. 538 F. Supp. 589, 591-92 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
206. Id. at 592.
207. Id. at 591, n.1.
208. See supra note 73.
209. See supra notes 182-92 and accompanying text.
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should no longer be used to penalize lesbians and gay men who are con-
victed for public expressions of their sexual identity.
IM. Sodomy and Public Morality Offenses
To appreciate the irrationality of treating sodomy and other homosexual
offenses as crimes of moral turpitude or as bars to a finding of good
moral character, it is crucial to understand that, both in the United
States and in many countries across the world, prosecution of lesbians
and gay men under these statutes serves no purposes other than those
of harassment, discrimination, and, in some cases, state-sponsored vio-
lence 2 10 against lesbians and gay men. This section will provide an
overview of the discriminatory misuse of these statutes against lesbians
and gay men in the United States and internationally.
A. Sodomy Statutes in the United States and Worldwide
Within the United States, consensual sodomy is still a crime in twenty-
two states and the District of Columbia.21 1 The precise acts proscribed
vary from statute to statute, although most focus on oral-genital and/or
anal-genital contact. 2 12 Others are extremely open-ended, referring
only to "crimes against nature" or to "unnatural and lascivious acts" in
lieu of naming specific acts. 213
210. See infra notes 231, 262-64, 270 and accompanying text.
211. Ala. Code § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-1411-1412
(Supp. 1988); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 5-14-122 (1987); D.C. Code Ann. § 22-3502 (1981);
Fla. Stat. §§ 800.02 (1987); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (1988); Idaho Code § 18-6605
(1987); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3505 (Supp. 1987); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:89 (West
1986); Md. Code Ann. art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1987); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.158,
750.338-.338(b) (1979); Minn. Stat. § 609.293 (1988); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-59
(1972); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.090 (1986); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45-2-101, 45-5-505
(1987); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.190 (1987); N.C. Gen Stat. § 14-177 (1986); Okla. Stat.
tit 21, § 886 (1981); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-10-1 (1986); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-120
(Law. Co-op. 1985); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-612 (1982); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
403 (Supp. 1988); Va. Code Ann. § 18-2-361 (1988).
In 1986, the Supreme Court held that the criminalization of lesbian and gay sex
under state sodomy statutes does not violate the constitutional right to privacy. Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
212. See Alabama, Arkansas, D.C., Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia,
and Utah statutes, supra note 211. In addition, some states have separate statutes
that criminalize oral-genital contact as a "lewd and lascivious act" or "sexual miscon-
duct." See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1412 (Supp. 1988).
213. See Arizona, Idaho, Lousiana, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahama,
and Tennessee statutes, supra note 211, ("crimes against nature"), and Florida stat-
ute, supra note 211, ("unnatural and lascivious act" and "the abominable and detesta-
ble crime against nature").
The Supreme Court has twice upheld the constitutionality of open-ended sodomy
statutes against vagueness challenges. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975) (per
curiam) (upholding Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-612 (1980)); Wainwright v. Stone, 414
U.S. 21 (1973) (per curiam) (upholding Fla. Stat. § 800.02 (1987)).
In many states, the government need not specify the acts supporting the indict-
ment. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 22-3502 (1981) (stating that "it shall not be necessary to
set forth the particular unnatural or perverted sexual practice with the commission of
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Different statutes also affect different classes of persons. Some
apply only to men, while others either specifically include both men and
women,214 or have been interpreted by courts to include acts by either
gender.215 Although several states criminalize acts of homosexual sod-
omy only, the majority of statutes apply to heterosexual and homosexual
acts alike.216 In practice, however, even facially neutral statutes are
enforced disproportionately against gay men and lesbians.2 17
Because private sexual behavior is difficult to police, especially with-
out violating Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures, sodomy statute violations between consenting
adults are rarely prosecuted in the United States.2 18 The primary func-
tion of sodomy statutes is to justify other types of discrimination against
gay men and lesbians, such as denial of employment and interference
with parental rights, 219 and to legitimate the enforcement of homosex-
ual solicitation and other public morality laws. 220
which the defendant may be charged, nor to set forth the particular manner in which
said unnatural or perverted practice was committed"). See also RUTHANN ROBSON,
LESBIAN (OUT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW, 48-54 (1992) (discussing lack
of specificity in sodomy statutes and case law).
214. See ROBSON, supra note 213, at 47-59 (discussing the 22 state sodomy statutes
that apply to lesbians as well as gay men).
215. See, e.g., ROBSON, supra note 213, at 53 (citing Saylers v. State, 755 P.2d 97
(Okla. Crim. App. 1988)).
216. Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, and Nevada prohibit only same-gender
sodomy, see supra note 211. The sodomy statutes of some other states apply only to
homosexuals because courts have invalidated the statute as applied to heterosexuals.
See, e.g., Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
890 (1986); State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
864 (1977); State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1979).
217. See Pearson, The Right of Privacy and Other Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Stat-
utes, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 811, 846 & n.228 (1984); Shelley R. Weick, Constitutional
Challenges to Sodomy Statutes in the Context of Homosexual Activity After Bowers v. Hardwick,
32 S.D. L. REV. 323, 331 & n.77 (1987). Although sodomy statutes are less fre-
quently used to prosecute lesbians than gay men, the extent to which lesbians are
prosecuted is often significantly understated. See Louis Crompton, The Myth of Lesbian
Impunity: Capital Laws from 1270 to 1791, 6J. HOMOSEXUALITY 11 (1980-81); Ruthann
Robson, Lesbianism in Anglo-European Legal History, 5 Wisc. WOM. L.J. 1 (1990); ROB-
SON, supra note 213, at 47-59.
218. The Editors of the Harvard Law Review, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW,
10-11 (1990) [hereinafter SEXUAL ORIENTATION] (noting, however, that "military reg-
ulations prohibiting sodomy . . . are enforced against military personnel, some of
whom are currently in prison for private, consensual, same-sex sexual conduct").
For an exhaustive account of the prosecution of U.S. servicepersons for acts of con-
sensual sodomy under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, ch. 47 art. 10, § 925
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1983)), see RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: LES-
BIANS AND GAYS IN THE U.S. MILITARY, VIETNAM TO THE PERSIAN GULF 373-735
(1993).
219. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 218, at 11; RICHARD MOHR, GAYS/JUS-
TICE 51 n.9 (1988).
220. MOHR, supra note 219, at 54-55. See, e.g., ADvoc., Nov. 20, 1990, at 27 ("Larry
Fox, the principal of Dodge City High School, was suspended from his job without
pay Oct. 11 after being charged with sodomy and lewd and lascivious behavior for
allegedly having sex with another man in the back row of a movie theater in Wichita
[Kansas]").
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Worldwide, at least 67 countries criminalize sex between men, and
at least 27 criminalize sex between women.22 1 Some of these countries
follow the U.S. pattern and retain sodomy laws on the books but rarely
investigate or prosecute violations. 222 In many countries, however, laws
criminalizing lesbian and gay sex are rigorously enforced, and the pun-
ishments imposed are extremely severe, ranging from the death pen-
alty223 to imprisonment 224 and involuntary psychiatric treatment. 225
Laws against homosexuality tend to be most severe in African, 226
Asian,2 27 Middle Eastern,2 28 and Oceanic2 2 9 countries. Most European
states have decriminalized private consensual sodomy, 230 with the
221. See THE THIRD PINK Boox: A GLOBAL VIEW OF LESBIAN AND GAY OPPRESSION
249-342 (Aart Hendriks et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter PINK BOOK]; COMING OUT: AN
ANTHOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN WRITINGS 6-116 (Stephan Likosky
ed., 1992) [hereinafter COMING OUT].
222. See PINK Boox, supra note 221, at 249-342 (noting infrequent enforcement of
sodomy laws in Barbados, Bhutan, Croatia, Ireland, Tanzania, Tasmania, and
Uganda, among others).
223. In Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Maurita-
nia, Yemen and other Islamic countries that enforce the Islamic Sharia code, homo-
sexuality is punishable by death, although in practice lesser punishments ranging
from flogging to imprisonment are usually imposed. Many Islamic countries punish
homosexuality under both religious and civil law. See PINK BooK, supra note 221, at
249-342; COMING OUT, supra note 221, at 102-14; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE
1993 REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AROUND THE WORLD 162 (1993) (noting the execu-
tion of an Iranian man accused of homosexuality).
224. States that actively prosecute under sodomy laws that impose prison
sentences include the following: Cyprus (up to 5 years); Ghana; Guyana (up to life
imprisonment); Lithuania (up to 8 years); Romania (up to five years); and South
Africa. See PINK BooK, supra note 221, at 272, 283, 287, 301, 318, 325. See also
Romania's Article 200: Gay Means Guilty, THE WARSAW VOICE,June 27, 1993 (reporting
arrest in Romania of two gay men detained and "beaten for ten hours with rubber
truncheons, horsewhips and fists by police hoping to force confessions").
225. See PINK BOOK, supra note 221, at 48, 318 (China and Romania); COMING OUT,
supra note 221, at 82-101 (Cuba); PETER TATCHELL, OUT IN EUROPE: A GUIDE TO LES-
BIAN AND GAY RIGHTS IN 30 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 24 (1992) (noting subjection of
lesbians and gay men in Romania to forcible drug treatment, electric shock therapy,
and castration).
226. See PINK BOOK, supra note 221 (African states criminalizing homosexual acts
include Algeria, Benin, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Libya,
Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa,
Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). See also Zimbabwe:
Gays Protest Discrimination, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 16, 1993, at 21; Lesbian and Gay
Rights in Namibia: Life in the Kalahari Closet, ILGA BULLETIN, May 1992, at 14. But see
Gerben Potman & Huub Ruijgrok, Male Homosexuality in West Africa, in PINK BOOK,
supra note 221, at 168 (noting that threat of enforcement of sodomy laws in most
African nations is remote).
227. See PINK BOOK, supra note 221 (states criminalizing homosexual acts include
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka in South Asia; China and Singapore in
East Asia; Malaysia in Southeast Asia).
228. See PINK BOOK, supra note 221 (states criminalizing homosexual acts include
Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United
Arab Emirate).
229. See PINK BOOK, supra note 221 (states criminalizing homosexual acts include
Fiji, Kiribati, Niue, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Toualu).
230. See TATCHELL, supra note 225, at 12-34. Many states in Eastern Europe and in
the former Soviet Union have recently abolished their sodomy laws, including
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exception of Ireland, Cyprus, Lithuania, Romania, and the former Yugo-
slavian republics of Bosnia, Macedonia, and Serbia.23 ' In Latin
America, the legal status of homosexuality varies widely from country to
country. 23 2
B. Public Morality Offenses
The presence or absence of sodomy laws, however, is not the only or
even the most meaningful index of legal discrimination against the
expression of lesbian and gay identity. As lesbian and gay activists and
commentators have long noted, the repeal of sodomy laws fails to
address the fact that most direct harassment and prosecution of lesbians
and gay men is accomplished through the abusive enforcement of a vari-
ety of statutes aimed at "public" and quasi-"public" activity. A 1974
study of homosexuality in New York, San Francisco and Northern
Europe, for example, noted that:
[The enforcement of sodomy laws is sporadic and rare, and the greatest
involvement of homosexuals with the criminal law occurs under misde-
meanor statutes. These statutes proscribe solicitation, disorderly con-
duct, lewd and lascivious behavior, and vagrancy, all of which are used
ostensibly to control the homosexual's sexual behavior and the public
pursuit of sexual partners. Often the 'disorderly conduct' laws are used
to arrest persons for acts for which no other punishment is provided in
the code. 'Lewd and lascivious behavior' provisions are used to punish
acts which range from dancing and hand holding to more explicit sexual
behavior. 'Vagrancy' laws are a convenient catchall used in a variety of
instances to harass homosexuals.233
The rationale behind the use of public morality statutes against les-
bians and gay men was most fully articulated in the 1957 Wolfenden
Report on Homosexuality and Prostitution, commissioned by the Eng-
lish Parliament to study and make recommendations with regard to
Slovakia (1990), Czechia (1990), Russia (1993), Estonia (1992), Latvia (1992), and
Ukraine (1991). See PINK BOOK, supra note 221, at 208, 273, 277, 299, 324, 336;
Russia Revokes Law Punishing Gay Sex, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 1993, at A5 (noting repeal
of Article 121.1 of the Russian Criminal Code punishing sexual relations between
men by up to 5 years imprisonment).
231. PINK BooK, supra note 221 at 263, 272, 292, 301, 302, 318, 322. See also Ser-
bia's War on Gays, ILGA BuLLETIN, May 1992, at 5-6 (describing government anti-
homosexual campaign and rising levels of police and gang violence against lesbians
and gay men).
232. See International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, Queer Latin
America, TEMA: INTERNATIONAL, Spring 1992, at 15-18 [hereinafter Queer Latin
America] (Latin American states that criminalize homosexuality include the Bahamas,
Barbados, Bermuda, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad and
Tobago).
233. Steven A. Rosen, Police Harassment of Homosexual Women and Men in New York
City 1960-1980, COLUM. HUm. RTs. L. REv. 159, 164 (1980-1981) (citing M. Wein-
berg & C. Williams, MALE HOMOSEXUALS 23 (1974)). See also Evan Wolfson & Brad
Sears, Public Lewdness Cases: Fighting Entrapment and Stereotypes, 8 LAMBDA UPDATE 22
(1991) (noting that "loitering, lewdness, and solicitation statutes provide the princi-
pal weapons for the regulation of gay sexual activity"); MARTIN HOFFMAN, THE GAY
WORLD: MALE HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE CREATION OF EvI. 97-99 (1968).
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homosexuality and prostitution in the United Kingdom. 23 4 Although
the authors of the Report accepted the premise that homosexuality is a
social and moral evil, they recommended abolishing laws criminalizing
private homosexual behavior, 23 5 on the ground that purely private
behavior was beyond the proper reach of legal intervention:
Unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society, acting through the
agency of the law, to equate the sphere of crime with that of sin, there
must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief
and crude terms, not the law's business. To say this is not to condone or
encourage private immorality. 23 6
The proper role of the law, the Report concluded, was to remove
itself from policing purely private behavior, and to concentrate instead
on eliminating any public expression of homosexual identity.23 7 The
necessary counterpart to the decriminalization of private homosexual
behavior, in other words, was an increased policing of public spaces and
public behavior. "It is important," the Report cautioned, "that the lim-
ited modification of the law which we propose should not be interpreted
as an indication that the law can be indifferent to other forms of homo-
sexual behavior, or as a general license to adult homosexuals to behave
as they please." 23 8 Specifically, the Report advocated stringent police
surveillance of public spaces, such as lavatories and parks, 23 9 harsh pen-
alties for procurement 240 and public solicitation,2 41 a higher age of con-
sent for homosexual than for heterosexual sex,24 2 and increased
discrimination against homosexuals in certain areas of employment.
243
In essence, the strategy behind the Wolfenden Report was to contain
234. The Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution, THE WOLFENDEN
REPORT (Amer. ed. 1963) [hereinafter WOLFENDEN REPORT].
235. Id. at 42-48 (concluding that "moral conviction or instinctive feeling, how-
ever strong, is not a valid basis for overriding the individual's privacy and for bring-
ing within the ambit of the criminal law private sexual behavior," and that
"homosexual acts between consenting adults in private should cease to be criminal
offenses").
236. Id. at 48.
237. Id. at 42 ("It is... part of the function of the law to preserve public order and
decency. We therefore hold that when homosexual behavior between males takes
place in public it should continue to be dealt with by the criminal law."). See also
GARY KINSMAN, THE REGULATION OF DESIRE 139-44 (1987) (critizing the Wolfenden
Report's reliance on a public/private distinction).
238. WOLFENDEN REPORT at 77.
239. Id. at 49, 73, 128.
240. Id. at 73 (recommending that "it should continue to be an offense, punishable
with a maximum of two years' imprisonment, for a third party to procure or attempt
to procure an act of gross indecency between male persons, whether or not the act to
be procured constitutes a criminal offense").
241. Id. at 73-75.
242. Id. at 51-52.
243. Id. at 128 (urging that "more care should be taken by those responsible for
the appointment of teachers, youth leaders and others in similar positions of trust, to
ensure that men known to be, or suspected of being, of homosexual tendencies,
should be debarred from such employment").
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homosexuality within a strictly confined sphere and to prohibit any pub-
lic expression of lesbian or gay identity.
Public lewdness, solicitation and other public morality statutes are
the primary tools through which this strategy of containment is
enforced. These statutes are "invoked against sexual expression-
including loitering, flirtation, solicitation, and actual sexual
encounters-outside the home. While such laws do not [usually] refer
to gay sex specifically, they are enforced almost exclusively against peo-
ple perceived to be gay."' 244 Similarly, although the official rationale
behind these statutes is the need to protect the public against offensive
or annoying behavior,24 5 they are actually enforced against conduct that
is public in name only,24 6 and that is almost always discovered only
through undercover police activity24 7 or hidden video surveillance. 248
As Arthur Warner has pointed out:
the very methods which have to be employed by the police to apprehend
persons for homosexual soliciting is proof of the inoffensiveness of the
conduct .... these are certainly not the methods customarily required to
apprehend persons whose conduct is alleged to be so open and blatant
244. Gabriel Rotello & Evan Wolfson, Fighting Back: Rest Stop Arrests, Police Abuse,
and the Gay and Lesbian Community, LrrrIE BLACK BOOK 4 (1992).
245. See supra notes 237-44 and accompanying text; see also Arthur C. Warner, Non-
Commercial Sexual Solicitation: The Case for Judicial Invalidation, reprinted in 6 HoMOSEXU-
ALIrY: DISCRIMINATION, CRIMINOLOGY, AND THE LAw, 551 (Wayne R. Dynes & Ste-
phen Donaldson eds., 1992) (originally submitted as an amicus curiae brief in Pryor v.
Municipal Court, 599 P.2d 636 (1979) (invalidating California solicitation statute on
due process grounds)).
246. See Warner, supra note 245, at 552:
Evidence abounds that homosexual solicitation is extremely circumspect and
cautious in character, and that, with few exceptions, the conduct is so subtle
in its use of indirection, innuendo, and subterfuge, that only the cognoscenti
are aware of what is going on .... the stereotype... of a brazen and flagrant
homosexual accosting and affronting defenseless respondents who are
repelled by his conduct is largely myth, which, like other myths regarding
homosexuals and homosexuality, is frequently repeated to justify repressive
and unjust laws.
Rotello & Wolfson, supra note 244, at 4 (noting that "many so-called 'public' areas
are in fact quite often private, for example, secluded woods or parks, beaches, 'lov-
ers' lanes', rest rooms, and highway rest stops"); Ruthann Robson, Li fting Belly: Pri-
vacy, Sexuality &Lesbianism, 12 WoM.'s RTs. L. RPR. 177 (1990) (discussing arbitrary
definitions of public and private in public sex caselaw).
247. People are almost never arrested because someone else saw them having
sex, was offended, and called the police. Rather, they are almost always
arrested because a police officer spent hours hanging around a targeted area
pretending to be interested in sexual contact, engaged in flirtatious behavior
or conversation, and then sprang the trap.
Rotello & Wolfson, supra note 244, at 5-6. See also Project, The Consenting Adult Homo-
sexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles
County, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 643, 691 (1966); Thomas E. Lodge, There May Be Harm in
Asking: Homosexual Solicitations and the Fighting Words Doctrine, 30 CASE WEST. L. REV.
461, 479-85 (1980); WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 234, at 75 ("This particular
offense necessarily calls for the employment of plain-clothes police if it is to be suc-
cessfully detected.").
248. FrederickJ. Desroches, Tearoom Trade: A Law Enforcement Problem, 33 CAN.J. OF
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4-10 (1991).
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that it constitutes an affront to public decency.2 49
Despite its inconsistencies, however, the Wolfenden perspective on
the public expression of lesbian and gay identity has profoundly influ-
enced the repeal of sodomy laws in Canada, the United States, Europe,
and Latin America. 250 In practical terms, the effect of the Wolfenden
strategy in states and countries that have adopted it has been to increase
dramatically police surveillance, harassment, and prosecution of lesbi-
ans and gay men under public morality statutes. In the four years after
England abolished its sodomy law in 1967, prosecutions for homosexual
offenses increased by 160 percent. 25 ' A similar increase in police sur-
veillance and prosecution resulted when Canada decriminalized sodomy
in 1969, and when Northern Ireland abolished its sodomy laws in
1982.252
Currently, laws and government policies that target the public
expression of lesbian and gay identity continue to pose the primary legal
threat to many lesbians and gay men worldwide. In countries influenced
by the Wolfenden perspective, the privacy rationale has been used to
justify the legal harassment of lesbians and gay men, and to reinforce
the view that homosexuality is immoral and socially objectionable and
should be severely restrained. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the
legal status of lesbians and gay men has deteriorated significantly in
recent years. From 1980 to 1988, 10,476 gay men were prosecuted
under public indecency statutes, for conduct ranging from kissing and
hugging to sexual contact. 253 Clause 25 of the Criminal Justice bill,
passed in 1991, imposes the same punishment on men caught having
sex in bathrooms or other public places as on those who rape.2 54 Police
have also increasingly used Section 5 of the Public Order Act, originally
intended to prevent street violence, to convict lesbians and gay men for
kissing and other public displays of affection. 255
Lesbians and gay men in the United States and Canada have exper-
ienced a similar escalation of police harassment. "In the past several
249. Warner, supra note 245, at 552.
250. See KINSMAN, supra note 237, at 139-72; BARRY ADAM, THE RISE OF A LESBIAN
AND GAY MOVEMENT (1987); DanielJ. Kane, Homosexuality and the European Convention
on Human Rights: What Rights?, I 1 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 447, 448-464
(1988) (analyzing the extent to which the European Court of Human Rights has been
limited in its adjudication of cases dealing with homosexuality by relying on a privacy
rationale that "give[s] subtle credence to ... the notion that homosexuality is inher-
ently immoral"); Anti-Gay Bill in Nicaragua Opposed in S.F., S.F. CHRON.,Jul. 10, 1992,
at A17 (reporting passage in Nicaragua of legislation decriminalizing sodomy, but
imposing up to 3 years imprisonment on anyone who "induces, promotes, propa-
gandizes or practices in a scandalous manner, the cohabitation between individuals
of the same sex").
251. KINSMAN, supra note 237, at 143.
252. Id. at 143-46. See also HOFFMAN, supra note 233, at 97-98 (noting increase in
police harassment of homosexuals after Illinois became the first U.S. state to abolish
its sodomy law in 1961).
253. TATCHELL, supra note 225, at 29.
254. OUTWEEK, Jan. 16, 1991, at 43.
255. TATCHELL, supra note 225, at 30.
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years," notes a recent study, "numerous police forces across Canada
have . . . launched full-scale criminal investigations in response to a
minor criminal offence common to urban areas-the use of public
washrooms (tearooms) for impersonal sex." 256 In the early 1980's, hun-
dreds of men in Toronto alone were arrested for "indecent acts" and
"gross indecency."' 2 57 In the United States, lesbian and gay publications
abound with reports of threats, arrests and raids on parks, clubs, thea-
tres, bathrooms, roadside reststops and other places known to be fre-
quented by lesbians and gay men. 258
Although relatively few Latin American states explicitly criminalize
lesbian or gay sex, 259 many of these states use public morality laws to
harass, arrest, and intimidate lesbians and gay men, and to prevent them
from organizing politically. 260 In Mexico, plans to hold an international
gay conference in Guadalajara in 1991 had to be canceled because of
threats by local officials to arrest those attending.26 1 Until a democratic
regime was recently installed in Argentina, police conducted an ongoing
campaign of harassment that led, in 1990, to the arrest of an estimated
thirty men per night for offenses ranging from "sexual promiscuity in
public" to wearing "improper clothes."' 26 2 In 1992, Canada granted
political asylum to an Argentinian gay man who had been repeatedly
detained, threatened and tortured by Argentinian police. 263 In Colom-
bia and Costa Rica, official violence has reached similar extreme levels
with hundreds of gay men and transvestites reported murdered or miss-
256. Desroches, supra note 248, at 1.
257. KINSMAN, supra note 237, at 210.
258. See, e.g., Wolfson & Sears, supra note 233, at 22 (noting arrest of more than
540 men for "public lewdness" at a single rest stop on the NewJersey Turnpike from
February, 1988 to October, 1989); OuTrwEEY, Nov. 14, 1990, at 26 (reporting arrest
of two men in Cincinatti for "disorderly conduct by creating an offensive condition"
for sitting inside a parked car holding hands); OtrrWEEK, Nov. 28, 1990, at 14-15
(reporting conviction of two pairs of men in Idaho for "indecent exposure" for hav-
ing sex in parked cars at night outside of a gay bar); OUTWEEK, Sept. 12, 1990, at 21-
22 (reporting arrest of 41 patrons of gay bar in Lima, Ohio for "visiting a disorderly
house"); ADVOCATE, Sept. 24, 1991, at 56-57 (reporting arrest by plainclothes officers
of 39 men in a Fayetteville, Arkansas park on charges ranging from loitering to solic-
iting sodomy); NYQ, Mar. 1, 1991, at 20-21 (reporting arrest for sodomy of 14 men
at two gay clubs in D.C.).
259. See supra note 232.
260. Repression Way of Life for Gays in Latin America, ORLANDO SENrINEL TRIB., Feb.
13, 1992, at A8:
In Latin America, military regimes that governed much of the region during
most of the last 50 years either outlawed homosexuality or made it difficult
for gays to act openly by allowing police to detain them for violating vague
laws that prohibit everything from 'offending public morality' to having
'immoral purposes'....
Queer Latin America, supra note 232, at 16-17 (stating that states using public morality
laws to arrest homosexuals include Argentina, Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and
Peru).
261. Gays Call OffBig Meeting in Mexico, S.F. CHRON., June 13, 1992, at A23.
262. OUTWEEK, Jul. 25, 1990, at 28; OUrWEEK, Dec. 5, 1990, at 21-22.
263. Matter of Inaudi, No. T91 04459 (Immigration and Refugee Board 1992).
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ing as a result of police brutality and state-sponsored death squads. 264
As this overview demonstrates, governments worldwide use public
morality laws to force lesbians and gay men to conceal their sexual ori-
entation, to stigmatize and discourage homosexuality, and to punish
political dissent and social nonconformity. In recent years, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, 265 the Council of Europe,26 6 the United
Nations (U.N.), and other international human rights organizations have
increasingly recognized and condemned this worldwide harassment and
abuse. In 1993, two lesbian and gay human rights groups, the New
York-based Human Rights Watch and the Brussels-based International
Lesbian and Gay Association were granted formal recognition by the
Economic and Social Council, the U.N. body responsible for monitoring
violations of international human rights agreements. 26 7 The U.N.
Human Rights Commission has shown an increasing willingness to rec-
ognize the claims of lesbian and gay men, 268 and Amnesty International
now recognizes lesbians and gay men imprisoned under sodomy and
public morality statutes as prisoners of conscience. 2 69 A growing
number of countries, including the United States, have granted political
asylum to lesbians and gay men persecuted in their country of origin.270
264. PINK BOOK, supra note 221, at 286 (noting that lesbians and gay men "are
often subjected to official and police harassment and violence"); AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL 1993 REPORT, supra note 223, at 99, 103-04 (noting murder of homosexuals in
Colombia and of transvestites in Costa Rica by government-sponsored "death
squads").
265. In 1982, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that a Northern Ireland
sodomy statute criminalizing homosexuality violated the European Convention of
Human Rights. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982);
Dudgeon II, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982).
266. See Resolution 756 and Recommendation 924, 1981 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R.
82 (asking World Health Organization to remove homosexuality from its interna-
tional classification of mental disorders and affirming that all individuals have the
right of sexual self-determination); 2 EUR. CONV. ON H.R., TEXTS & DOCUMENTS 136-
38 (1984) (calling on member states of the Council of Europe to abolish all forms of
discrimination against homosexuals). See also Kane, supra note 250, at 464-66 (dis-
cussing the Council of Europe's recognition of the right of sexual self-
determination).
267. United Nations: Gay Group, Human Rights Body Gain a Place at U.N., INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Mar. 30, 1993. Human Rights Watch was granted "consultative status,"
which gives it the right to participate in U.N. conferences, submit statements as offi-
cial U.N. documents, and introduce oral and written statements at ECOSOC meet-
ings. The International Lesbian and Gay Association was granted "roster status,"
which allows it to submit written statements only.
268. U.N. Investigates Human Rights Violations, INT'L LESBIAN & GAY Ass'N BULL., Jan.
1993, at 21 (reporting that the U.N. Human Rights Commission has accepted a com-
plaint arguing that a Tasmanian law prohibiting homosexual acts violates the U.N.
Human Rights Convention).
269. See GUIDELINES: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S WORK ON BEHALF OF IMPRISONED
HOMOSEXUALS (1992).
270. See, e.g., Matter of Toboso, No. A23 220 644 (BIA 1990) (withholding depor-
tation of gay Cuban man because of persecution of gays in Cuba); Matter of Inaudi,
No. T91 04459 (Immigration and Refugee Board 1992) (Canadian decision granting
asylum to Argentinian gay man repeatedly detained and tortured by Argentinian
police); Gay Couple Escapes Aainland Repression, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 25,
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Ironically, however, the INS and many U.S. courts persist in recog-
nizing discriminatory convictions under public morality statutes as
crimes of moral turpitude.271 Because the INS and the courts have not
reevaluated their irrational and anachronistic interpretation of these
provisions, individuals who have ever been convicted of or who admit to
a public same-gender sex offense, including those who may be seeking
refuge from homophobic persecution in their country of origin, may be
precluded from visiting or immigrating to the United States under the
provision for crimes involving moral turpitude, or barred from citizen-
ship under the good moral character requirement.
IV. Analysis
A. The Status of Nemetz After Bowers v. Hardwick and the 1990 Act
Nemetz barred courts that adopted its analysis from using evidence about
private homosexual activity to evaluate good moral character. 272 Nemetz
also dramatically affected the crimes involving moral turpitude exclu-
sion. Only acts "harmful to the public" can trigger the exclusion; pri-
vate consensual acts, even if they result in a felony under state or
national law, cannot.273 In practice, however, the holding in Nemetz was
quite limited in terms of the behavior it protected. Only private homo-
sexual acts that are rarely prosecuted anyway came within its holding. 274
The major effect of Nemetz was to prevent INS officials from using an
individual's homosexual identity to infer an automatic violation of the
crimes involving moral turpitude provision, or an automatic bar of good
moral character. As long as the categorical exclusion was in place, the
INS could still use sodomy convictions or other evidence of homosexual
identity to exclude gay and lesbian entrants. Nemetz opened up a narrow
space in which homosexual aliens who had managed to avoid exclusion
could squeeze past the crimes involving moral turpitude deportation
provision and the good moral character requirement for naturalization.
Despite the appearance of a direct conflict, Bowers v. Hardwick did
not pose a serious challenge to the Nemetz holding that there is no fed-
eral interest in regulating private homosexual behavior.275 In Bowers,
the Supreme Court rejected a substantive due process challenge to the
constitutionality of a Georgia sodomy statute that was enforced against a
gay man for private behavior in his own home.276 The Court explicitly
ruled that homosexuals do not possess a constitutionally protected right
1992, at 7 (reporting Australian decision to grant asylum to a gay couple from
China).
271. See supra Section II.
272. 647 F.2d 432, 436-37 (4th Cir. 1981). Nemetz has not, however, been univer-
sally accepted. See In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1219 (1984).
273. Nemetz, 647 F.2d at 436.
274. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
275. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
276. Id. at 191-96.
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of privacy. 27 7 Although this holding authorized states to pass or to con-
tinue to enforce sodomy statutes that single out homosexual activity,
this did not threaten the Nemetz doctrine. The Nemetz court itself recog-
nized that states could regulate and criminalize private sexual behav-
ior.27 8 The Nemetz court merely held that private sexual behavior is
irrelevant in the context of federal immigration law, so long as it has no
harmful public impact. 2 79 Both cases, albeit for very different reasons,
actually reinforce the doctrine that regulating sexual morality is
uniquely a state and not a federal prerogative.
Moreover, the 1990 Act has offset the one respect in which Bowers
undercuts the rationale behind Nemetz and its predecessors. By exempt-
ing private consensual homosexual conduct from the scrutiny of federal
immigration law, Nemetz and other cases relied in part on the argument
that legal regulation of such behavior violated the federal constitutional
right to privacy, 280 an argument that Bowers has now demolished. None-
theless, by repealing the categorical exclusion of lesbians and gay men,
Congress signaled its intention to eliminate sexual orientation and con-
sensual sexual behavior as a factor in immigration policy. 2 8 ' The
absence of a constitutional right to privacy for homosexuals does not
prevent Congress from acting on its own to shield sexual behavior from
the scrutiny of the immigration law.2 82
B. Expanding Nemetz
1. Equal Protection
Now that the 1990 Act has bolstered the holding in Nemetz, the challenge
is to expand the argument in Nemetz to include public as well as private
same-gender sexual offenses, and thus to place homosexual and hetero-
sexual aliens on more equal footing with respect to the "crimes involv-
ing moral turpitude" and the "good moral character" provisions.
Although the disparate impact of sodomy and public morality offenses
on gays and lesbians under U.S. immigration law seems tailor-made for
an equal protection challenge, there are two reasons why such a chal-
lenge probably cannot succeed. The first is that most federal courts
have been unwilling to consider gays and lesbians a suspect class, and
thus they have been unwilling to subject laws that discriminate on the
277. Id.
278. Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432, 435 n.3 (4th Cir. 1981) ("We point out that
nothing in this opinion interferes with a state's right to set legislative standards of
morality for its own purposes.").
279. Id. at 436-37. See discussion supra notes 182-92 and accompanying text.
280. Nemetz, 647 F.2d 432,434 (4th Cir. 1981); In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 927
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Stanley v.
Georgia, 374 U.S. 557 (1969)).
281. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
282. As Congress has also done with respect to adulterers. See infra notes 296-308
and accompanying text.
Cornell International Law Journal
basis of sexual orientation to more than rational basis review. 283
The second reason is that most constitutional arguments are of lit-
tle or no avail in the immigration context anyway. In no other area have
the courts shown such deference to the plenary power of Congress and
the Executive to define and administer the law without interference from
the judiciary.284 Even if the Supreme Court in Bowers had declared the
Georgia statute an unconstitutional violation of due process, Congress
would still have plenary power to exclude persons for committing sod-
omy, just as Congress now has plenary power to exclude persons based
on race or national origin.285 Courts review equal protection challenges
to U.S. immigration law, whether to the terms of the statute itself or to
its administration, under a standard that is even more toothless than
rational basis review. Because of the plenary powers doctrine, the INS
need only articulate a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" 28 6 for
its administration of the statute, even when its actions infringe on a fun-
damental right 28 7 or discriminate against a suspect class. 28 8
2. The Uniformity Requirement
Given the probable futility of an equal protection challenge, the most
powerful argument against using sodomy and public morality offenses
to exclude, deport, or deny naturalization derives from two sources: the
Constitutional requirement that there be a "uniform rule of naturaliza-
tion"; 289 and the obligation of courts and administrative agencies to
283. See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Baker v. Wade,
769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Dronenberg v.
Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1984). But see Watkins v. United States Army,
847 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted en banc, 847 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1988);
Ben Shalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Wis. 1989); High Tech Gays v.
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
284. See, e.g., Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339(1909); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). For an analysis of the virtual immunity of
immigration law from constitutional judicial review, see generally Peter Schuck, The
Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLuM. L. REv. 1 (1984); Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statu-
tory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990).
285. Id. See also Mattews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976) (allowing Congress to
"make rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens").
286. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
287. In Kleindienst, the Court held that immigration authorities could exercise the
plenary power delegated to them by Congress and the Attorney General to override
the First Amendment rights of citizens, as long as the officials could articulate a
"facially legitimate and bona fide" reason for their decisions. 408 U.S. at 770.
288. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-800 (1977) (holding that INA provisions that
discriminate on the basis of gender and legitimacy are immune from constitutional
judicial review). But see Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (holding that discrimina-
tion on the basis of race or national origin in determining whether to grant tempo-
rary parole to Haitians filing asylum claims would be unlawful because contrary to
the INA).
289. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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construe a statute in accordance with its legislative intent.29 0 The uni-
form rule of naturalization provisions has been held to require only geo-
graphic, not substantive, uniformity. It does not impose the equivalent
of an equal protection guarantee preventing Congress from imposing
different conditions of naturalization for different classes of aliens, but
rather prevents individual states from enacting their own naturalization
statutes and thus disrupting the uniformity of the federal rule.29 1
In other words, immigration is uniquely a federal matter, and Con-
gress intended the immigration law to prescribe uniform standards
across the nation. 29 2 Courts have long accepted that this minimal
requirement of geographic uniformity is not confined to the specific pro-
visions governing naturalization, but applies throughout the immigra-
tion law context, including the crimes involving moral turpitude
provision. 29 3
3. The Example of Adultery
The precise limits of this uniformity requirement, however, are con-
tested. Courts have disagreed on whether or not the uniformity require-
ment means that just as individual states cannot directly confer federal
citizenship, 2 94 neither can the vagaries of state law indirectly determine
who may and who may not enter the country or become a citizen. 29 5
This disagreement has been most evident in cases dealing with adultery
and the good moral character requirement. From 1952 to 1981, the
INA explicitly listed the commission of an act of adultery during the five-
year statutory period as an automatic bar to a finding of good moral
character. 29 6 Although some courts looked to the individual state's defi-
290. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984) (holding that courts "must reject administrative constructions
which are contrary to clear congressional intent"); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 446-48 (1987) (citing Chevron to reject INS interpretation of asylum provisions
of INA).
291. Kharaiti Ram Samras v. United States, 125 F.2d 879, 881 (9th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 634 (1942). Petition of Lee Wee, 143 F. Supp. 736, 738 (S.D. Cal.
1956).
292. SeeJ. KETrNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870 224-
25 (1978) (noting that the power to naturalize was delegated to Congress to avoid
the confusion that would arise from allowing individual states to confer citizenship).
293. See, e.g., Babouris v. Esperdy, 269 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1959) (soliciting men to
commit crimes against nature is a crime for the purposes of the immigration law even
though New York State law terms it an "offense").
294. Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817) (holding that the power to
determine who may gain citizenship is exclusively federal).
295. The need for uniformity among the states is the primary reason why Congress
has not amended the law to make deportability hinge on the commission of a felony,
instead of on a crime involving moral turpitude. Whether a particular crime is a
felony or a misdemeanor varies from state to state. See Burr v. INS, 350 F.2d 87, 90
(9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 915 (1966) (holding that use of a felony standard
to determine deportability would subject federal law to "niceties and nuances" of
state law).
296. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(2), repealed 1981. The definition of adultery differs greatly
from state to state. See Comment, Private Consensual Sexual Conduct and "The Good Moral
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nition of adultery,297 most courts found that relying on state law
defeated the requirment of a uniform federal standard, and held that
only adultery that harmed an existing marriage triggered the automatic
bar.29 8 In 1981, Congress implicitly endorsed the majority position on
the need for a uniform rule by eliminating adultery from the list of auto-
matic bars to a finding of good moral character. The legislative report
accompanying the amendment explained that inquiries into the sex lives
of applicants "clearly represent an invasion of privacy." '299
This resolution of the dispute over adultery strongly suggests in
Nemetz held that private homosexual sodomy must also receive uniform
treatment in the context of immigration. Decided in 1980 before Con-
gress changed the law with regard to adultery, Nemetz modelled its pro-
tection of sodomy that has no harmful public impact on the judicially-
created protection of adultery that has no harmful public impact.300
Sodomy and adultery are both rarely prosecuted offenses which are
criminalized in some states, but not in others.30' Like most of the courts
dealing with adultery, the Nemetz court found that relying on state sod-
omy laws would create an unacceptable geographic patchwork of natu-
ralization standards.30 2 If the uniformity requirement obliged courts to
devise a uniform federal definition of adultery in the naturalization con-
text, then it also obliged courts to devise a uniform federal policy
regarding sodomy.303
Although the Nemetz court might have achieved uniformity by bar-
ing anyone who committed an act of sodomy from a finding of good
moral character, this route to uniform treatment would have been dras-
tically at odds with the increasingly liberal treatment accorded by the
INS and the courts to adultery and other kinds of consensual sexual
behavior in the context of immigration.30 4
Character" Requirement of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L., 357, 365-70 (1975); Comment, State Adultery Laws and the "Good Moral Character"
Naturalization Requirement, 7 HARV. J. LEGIS. 295, 300-01 (1970). See also the discus-
sion of differences in state adultery laws in Brea-Garcia v. INS, 531 F.2d 693 (3d Cir.
1976).
297. See, e.g., Brea-Garcia v. INS, 531 F.2d 693, 697 (3d Cir. 1976).
298. See, e.g., Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 179, 812 (9th Cir. 1964); Moon Ho Kim v.
INS, 514 F.2d 179, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1975). For a discussion of this caselaw, see Mau-
rice A. Roberts, Sex and the Immigration Laws, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 29-34 (1976).
299. The view that INS officials have no business inquiring into the private sex
lives of petitioners for naturalization indicates that Congress was removing adultery
from the good moral character analysis, not directing INS officials to look to state
laws. The legislative report also quoted an INS estimate that "7 out of 10 persons
today who would admit to that conduct would fall within one or more of the judicial
interpretations which excuse that conduct for purposes of naturalization."
ALIENIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 4, at 961.
300. Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432, 436 (citing Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812 (9th
Cir. 1964)).
301. See supra notes 211-32 and accompanying text.
302. Nemetz, 647 F.2d at 435-36.
303. Id.
304. See supra notes 154-58, 296-97 and accompanying text.
Vol 26
1993 Penalizing Lesbian and Gay Identity
As the court in Nemetz recognized, the constitutional uniformity
requirement does not in itself prevent Congress or the courts from dis-
criminating against those who engage in homosexual activity or against
any other group. But courts also have an independent obligation to
interpret the immigration law in accordance with legislative intent.305
Accordingly, the Nemetz court based its decision both on the uniformity
requirement and on an appeal to legislative intent-namely, on the con-
clusion that Congress chose not to include homosexuality in the list of
conditions that automatically bar a finding of good moral character
because "it did not intend purely private sexual activities to act as an
absolute bar to a finding of good moral character."30 6 As the court in
Nemetz rightly concluded, the decision to exempt private consensual sod-
omy from the good moral character analysis was more faithful to the
statutory intent than the decision to deny naturalization to any alien who
engaged in homosexual sodomy would have been.
The Nemetz holding should be extended beyond private sodomy to
the public morality offenses that are used to police public expressions of
lesbian and gay identity and to harass lesbians and gay men. As the
court in Nemetz persuasively argued with respect to sodomy statutes, the
existence and enforcement of public morality offenses that target con-
sensual same-gender sexual activity vary widely from state to state, and
reliance on the vagaries of individual state and national laws violates the
requirement of a geographically uniform immigration law. Again, the
requirement of a uniform law does not in itself prohibit drafting or
administering the immigration law in a manner that discriminates
against a particular class of people. But the INS and the courts must
construe the INA according to the legislature's intent, and the 1990 Act
has now explicitly signalled that Congress no longer intends to single
out homosexual aliens for discrimination.
Here, too, the evolving treatment of adultery under U.S. immigra-
tion law provides a useful analogy. Because the pre-1981 immigration
law explicitly excluded adulterers from citizenship, the pre-1981 adul-
tery cases restricted protection to adulterers whose behavior did not
"destroy an existing, viable marriage" or otherwise "represent a threat
to public morality."'30 7 The elimination of adultery as a bar to good
moral character in 1981 also eliminated the legal significance of the dis-
tinction between private and public adultery.308 Acts of adultery, even
305. Nemetz, 647 F.2d at 436-37. See also supra note 290.
306. Nemetz, 647 F.2d at 437. The force of this statutory argument was obviously
strengthened by the fact that most courts did not treat discreet acts of adultery as a
bar to a finding of good moral character, despite the listing of adultery in the INA as
an automatic bar. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
307. Moon Ho Kim v. INS, 514 F.2d 179, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also supra notes
296-98 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 299 and accompanying text. Moreover, despite the fact that the
Constitutional right of privacy extends only peripherally, if at all, to adulterous
behavior, Congress registered an intent to recognize and protect the privacy of con-
sensual sexual behavior that is not only outside of marriage, but that is usually
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those that harm an existing marriage or that otherwise threaten public
morality, no longer constitute crimes of moral turpitude or bar a finding
of good moral character. Similarly, Nemetz restricted protection to
homosexuals who kept their sexual identity private because the immi-
gration law excluded homosexuals from entering the country.3 0 9 When
Congress eliminated the categorical exclusion of homosexuals in 1990,
it also eliminated the legal rationale for penalizing aliens for public
expressions of gay and lesbian identity. Public homosexual acts should
no longer constitute crimes of moral turpitude or bars to good moral
character.
In short, the "uniform rule of naturalization" clause of the Consti-
tution requires a uniform national standard to supersede the patchwork
of conflicting state and national laws criminalizing public consensual
homosexual behavior. This uniform national standard must either for-
mulate a national definition of the behavior that will constitute a crime
involving moral turpitude or bar a finding of good moral character; or, it
must hold that consensual sexual and affectionate homosexual behavior,
even when criminalized under state law, is neither morally turpitudinous
nor incompatible with good moral character. The first alternative is per-
missible only if it employs a non-discriminatory standard. A discrimina-
tory standard would conflict with Congress' express intent to eliminate
discrimination against homosexuals from the immigration law, and to
keep immigration officials out of the business of monitoring consensual
sexual behavior, even when criminalized under state laws regulating sex-
ual morality.
4. The Inequity of the Public-Private Distinction
Many courts might think that the distinction between public and private
behavior as articulated in Nemetz and in the pre-1981 adultery cases is
itself an appropriate and non-discriminatory standard, and that Nemetz
should be extended no further. Indeed, the articulated rationale behind
the public-private distinction in Nemetz was an egalitarian one, the idea
that exempting all private sexual behavior from the purview of the fed-
eral immigration law places homosexuals and heterosexuals on equal
footing. 3 10 According to this view, the distinction is both neutral and
fair, because it exempts all purely private behavior, and penalizes all
public behavior. Only those people, heterosexual and homosexual
alike, who choose to engage in public or quasi-public sexual activity are
at risk of incurring a penalty.
deemed destructive of marriage. See, e.g., Southern Surety Co. v. Oklahoma, 241 U.S.
582 (1916) (upholding constitutionality of state law criminalizing adultery); and
Commonwealth v. Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 537 (Mass. 1983) (upholding state's right to
criminalize adultery on grounds that it threatens institution of marriage).
309. 647 F.2d 432, 436-37 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that "the distinction between
private and public acts for purposes of naturalization" is decisive both for adultery
and homosexuality).
310. Id. at 434, n.1 (arguing that homosexual and heterosexual acts of sodomy
should be accorded equal treatment).
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This rationale must be challenged on several grounds. First, it
ignores the extent to which public heterosexual activity is not in fact
subject to the same surveillance and prosecution as homosexual activity.
Laws against public sexual behavior are not only frequently defined in
biased terms, they are also enforced disproportionately against gays and
lesbians.3 11 Solicitation is the prime example of a statutory offense that
singles out homosexuals by its very terms. The fact that merely asking a
person of the same gender to have sex is a crime in many jurisdictions
indicates how disparately the law still treats similarly situated persons of
different sexual orientations.3 12 Undercover police officers do not try to
entrap straight persons soliciting non-commercial sex.3 1 3 Moreover,
many laws that do apply to both orientations are enforced almost exclu-
sively against lesbians and gay men. Charges of disorderly conduct for
holding hands in the street or in a parked car, or of lewd and lascivious
behavior or public indecency for having sex in a secluded public place
are very rarely brought against heterosexuals. The police do not shut
down public parks known to be frequented by heterosexuals.
3 1 4
Second, because of legal and social discrimination, homosexual and
heterosexual people do not have equal access to privacy. Most obvi-
ously, gays and lesbians cannot marry.3 15 Except in jurisdictions with
civil rights legislation, they are not protected from discrimination in
housing and employment.3 16 For heterosexuals, the right to privacy is
not conditional on concealing one's sexual orientation from the world,
as it is for most lesbians and gay men. Heterosexuals do not, for
instance, have to hide their sexual identity in order to rent a house or an
apartment, or to find a job. It is, in fact, precisely because lesbians and
gay men lack equal access to privacy that they have been forced to create
alternative social spaces in which to socialize and find sexual and roman-
tic partners.3 1 7
Third, to restrict the definition of "private" behavior to activity
between two people alone in a private home is to insist on a very partial
and tendentious definition. This narrow interpretation of privacy uni-
versalizes the experience of married heterosexual couples who live in
private homes, and excludes the history and experience of lesbians and
gay men, and of the many heterosexuals whose lives do not conform to
this narrow pattern. Moreover, the conduct punished under public
morality statutes is "public" only in the most arbitrary legal sense; it
does not literally happen in front of indiscriminate passers-by, but
311. See supra notes 217-49 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 249.
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315. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION & L., supra note 218, at 9-31.
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317. See Wolfson & Sears, supra note 233, at 22 (noting that "[m]any of those
targeted [by public lewdness arrests] are people of color and the young, as well as
those not out or just stepping out of the closet, and those without homes or places to
which they dare bring others.").
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rather in spaces that the state defines as public.3 18 As historian Gary
Kinsman has observed:
[B]attles between the gay movement and the police are a manifestation of
social struggles over the State-defined distinction between public and pri-
vate. The police are trying to establish that gay baths, and male sex in
parks and washrooms, is public sex and therefore subject to their direct
intervention. The very institutions of the gay community would thus be
rendered "public." 3 19
The lesbian and gay movement, in turn, has sought to shift the meaning
of privacy from its narrow, state-controlled definition to one that is
grounded in the actual lives of lesbian and gay people. 320
Conclusion
The most effective way to challenge the discriminatory impact of public
morality offenses on lesbians and gay men under U.S. immigration law is
to extend the argument used in Nemetz to exempt private sodomy from
the good moral character analysis. That argument combined the "uni-
form rule of naturalization" requirement with an appeal to Congress'
intent with regard to private sexual behavior in the immigration stat-
ute.3 2 1 The 1990 Act clarified Congress' intention to eliminate discrimi-
nation against homosexuals in immigration.3 2 2 The 1990 Act was also
consistent with court decisions and legislative amendments that increas-
ingly exempted consensual sexual behavior from the scrutiny of the
immigration law.3 23 It appears that Congress did not intend for consen-
sual homosexual behavior, even when criminalized by state or national
law, to affect an alien's treatment under the immigration law.
Currently, conviction or admission of same-gender public morality
offenses triggers the crimes involving moral turpitude exclusion, and
can also be used to negate a finding of good moral character. This state
of affairs violates Congress' intent in the 1990 Act. The inconsistency
among state and national laws regulating public same-gender activity
and in enforcement from state to state and nation to nation also violates
the requirement of geographic uniformity in the federal immigration
law. Together, these violations of Congressional intent and of the uni-
formity requirement create a strong argument against the use of consen-
sual sodomy and public sex offenses for immigration purposes.
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